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ABSTRACT
Rhetoric associated with the development of nuclear power in the United States 
was analyzed over 3-decades in order to better understanding the beginnings and 
constituents of the rhetoric associated with anti-nuclear power perspectives. An 
amalgamation of existing historical/rhetorical methods utilized by Gamson and Modigliani 
(1989) and Darsey (1991) were employed. Progressive interpretive anti-nuclear rhetorical 
packages were identified for corresponding historical periods within the 34-year period. 
Historical periods were segmented by catalytic events, or incidents important to nuclear 
power development which also presented opportunities for anti-nuclear power rhetoric. 
The analysis reveals four individual rhetorical packages: 1) Pandora’s Box; 2) Mirage; 3) 
Devil’s Bargain, and; 4) Mirage Two. The analysis further demonstrates that anti-nuclear 
rhetoric is progressive, synergistic, requires maintenance, relies on the unknown, and 
exists beyond what is reported in the media.
I l l
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
I oppose nuclear energy [because] man has not suflBciently mastered the technology of 
the atom to justify the siting of nuclear power plants anywhere on earth, let alone in 
highly populated communities.
—Senator Edward Kennedy, New York Times
In this process the involved scientific community has been essentially ignored. We are 
inexperienced and inept at political or media gamesmanship. The problem is that our 
case is based on science, while the anti-nuclear case is based on political philosophy.
—Bernard L. Cohen, Before It's Too Late - A Scientist's Case For 
Nuclear Energy
In the predawn hours of July 16, 1945, physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer waited 
anxiously in a small observation shelter at a desolate site named Trinity in the New Mexico 
desert. The focus of his concern was a soon-to-be tested plutonium implosion bomb, aptly 
named "Jumbo," which sat atop a 100-foot tall steel tower. Oppenheimer had spent two 
years directing the efforts of an elite cadre of scientists at a secret laboratory in Los 
Alamos, New Mexico toward this moment.
At approximately 45 seconds after 5:29 in the morning, a radio signal was 
activated detonating "Jumbo" with an explosive force equal to nearly 20,000 tons of TNT. 
Oppenheimer who had been looking out the back door of the shelter, away from the blast, 
would later report that for an instant the desert was "bleached to a ghastly white" (Cahn, 
1995, p. 10). Through Oppenheimefs mind flashed a passage from the sacred Hindu text, 
the Bhagavad-Gita: "Now I am become death, the destroyer of worlds" (Cahn, 1995, p.
10) For a instant there was silence in the shelter - then Oppenheimer and the other
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scientists ran outside.
From the outside of the shelter, 10,000 yards from the explosion, scientists could 
see a quarter-mile-wide ball of reddish-yellow flame and smoke violently churning over 
ground zero. As the fireball continued to expand it rapidly climbed upward, sucking up 
desert and debris into a column that within half a minute extended a mile into the sky.
Philip Morrison, another young physicist working at Los Alamos was much further 
from the blast than Oppenheimer, but still recalled the event vividly:
The Trinity Test went off as planned on July 16, 1945, leaving lifelong indelible 
memories. None is as vivid for me as that brief flash of heat on my face, sharp as 
noonday for a watcher 10 miles away in the cold desert predawn, while our own false 
sun rose on the earth and set again. (Morrison, 1995, p. 33)
It was the first hour of the first day of the nuclear age, and nothing would ever be 
the same. Twenty-one days later, on August 6, the B-29 bomber Enola Gay flew into 
history by dropping the first atomic weapon on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. On 
August 9, a second and final atomic bomb was dropped on the Japanese city of Nagasaki.
The duel atomic bombings of Japan not only brought a swift end to the second 
World War, they also changed the nature of warfare forever, signaling the start of an arms 
race that is still unfolding: "At times, the threat of nuclear war has cast a long shadow over 
the lives of Americans." (Stover, August 1995) But the nuclear technology revealed 50- 
years ago has had an even more lasting impact on the daily lives of the American public.
Many Americans do not seem to give much thought to the power of the atom 
when they turn on their computers, televisions or microwave ovens. But nearly 21 percent
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of the electricity currently produced in the United States comes from nuclear power plants 
that are direct descendants of the atomic weapon. (“Nuclear Technology Milestones,” 
1992) Shortly after the United States atomically razed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, scientists 
and politicians who helped develop atomic weapons began to look for more peaceful 
applications for the destructive force they had unleashed.
In nuclear power, they saw a potentially inexhaustible supply of electricity. Early 
advocates of nuclear power proclaimed that it was a clean, safe source of energy with a 
flawless operating record. Others heralded nuclear power as one of the twentieth 
century's greatest scientific and technological achievements. By controlling the fission 
(splitting) of atoms, enormous quantities of energy could be harnessed to provide heat that 
would, in theory, run electric turbines indefinitely. The production of nuclear power also 
required relatively limited amounts of uranium fuel, which could be cheaply mined, 
processed or reprocessed.
Typically, this optimistic view of nuclear energy also lent itself to misconceptions 
and often fanciful predictions of the possible uses of power from the atom. In one account 
from 1946, "no baseball game will be called off on account of rain," because chunks of 
uranium, "artificial suns," mounted on towers would create controlling weather patterns. 
(Williams, 1992, p.25)
Even various contemporary views of nuclear power, although not quite as fanciful, 
still extol that, "the outlook for nuclear energy is as bright as its past accomplishments." 
(Williams, 1992, p.25) Phillip Bayne, President of the Nuclear Energy Institute in 
Washington D.C., declared in 1994 that "the dual goals of a clean environment and a
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strong economy can only be met if the country increases its use of nuclear energy" (“End 
of a Nuclear Road,” 1994).
Others who have observed and followed the development of the atom, however, 
do not share the same optimistic view of nuclear power. "This new confidence that we 
had a source of energy that would free us fi-om dependence on imported oil and provide 
nations with a plentiful supply of energy for eons without any threat to human life has 
been seriously eroded" (Price, 1982, p. 1).
Presently, opponents assert that nuclear energy is already a failed technology 
which exists only because of massive government subsidies. Some opponents have 
prematurely announced the death of nuclear energy: "the once bright world of nuclear 
power has already gone dark" (“End of a Nuclear Road,” 1994). Other concerns such as 
nuclear plant accidents, uncertainty over the disposal of radioactive wastes and increasing 
costs continue to be catalysts for continued rhetoric from organizations opposed to the 
use of nuclear energy. An archetypal example of this rhetoric is a poster showing the 
silhouette of a mother and child which reads, "What do you do in case of nuclear accident: 
kiss your children goodbye." (Grant, 1988, p. 30)
Thus, nuclear energy has been viewed as either incredible success or inevitable 
failure as it developed alongside and in the shadow of its sibling, the nuclear weapon. Just 
40 years ago, nuclear energy was an exotic technology, the subject of experiments and 
science fiction. Forty-years later, nuclear energy, with more than 100 operating plants in 
34 states, is the subject of controversy. And as a possible source of electrical energy in 
the United States in the future, the fate of nuclear energy is at best uncertain.
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That uncertainty stems from a highly publicized struggle over the use and future 
development of nuclear power. As a descendant of the atomic age, nuclear power has 
fostered different beliefs about its necessity since its emergence. Those beliefs developed 
into partisan viewpoints among like-minded individuals, which ultimately led to the 
formation of two, well-organized and opposing groups; one pro-nuclear power 
development and the other anti-nuclear power development. Currently, groups such as 
Public Citizen, Sierra Club and Critical Mass Energy Project oppose nuclear energy, while 
the Nuclear Energy Institute and U.S. Council for Energy Awareness support its 
continued use.
The rhetoric associated with and pervasive to the pro-nuclear development groups 
has been relatively consistent and easily identified since the inception of the atomic age. In 
a 1954 speech, for instance, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission chairman Lewis Strauss 
predicted this quixotic future; "Our children will enjoy in their homes electrical energy too 
cheap to meter” (Stover, 1995, p.43).
The rhetoric associated with anti-nuclear power development efforts, on the other 
hand, was uncommon in the early years of nuclear power development. This rhetoric is 
typically viewed as emerging during the 1960s and 1970s, a time when movement rhetoric 
became widespread in America. In actuality, anti-nuclear power rhetoric did begin 
somewhat slowly. However, as we shall see, it did not begin during the 1960s or 1970s, 
but nearly 20-years earlier at the dawn of the atomic age.
Nevertheless, many contemporary views still insist this rhetoric was not present in 
the early years of nuclear power. In a 1989 study, Gamson and Modigliani pointed out
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that even during the early development of nuclear power there were, "cautious skeptics 
who warned that the technological problems in tapping this energy source for human 
betterment are formidable and far from solved. But no opposition to nuclear power 
development is presented...In effect, there was no significant anti-nuclear power discourse 
during this era." (p. 14)
The belief that anti-nuclear power rhetoric did not originate with the emergence of 
nuclear power makes it a historically significant artifact for investigation. It is hoped that 
such an investigation will demonstrate that anti-nuclear power development rhetoric, while 
not as prevalent in the early years of nuclear power, did emerge at the dawn of the atomic 
age to develop into a unique rhetoric.
PURPOSE
The purpose of this study is to analyze the rhetoric surrounding the development 
of commercial nuclear power. Specifically, the investigation will focus on rhetoric 
associated with anti-nuclear power development viewpoints and efforts over a 34-year 
period in the United States from 1945 to 1979. The intent of this study is to develop a 
better understanding of the beginnings and constituents of the rhetoric associated with 
anti-nuclear power viewpoints. A thorough investigation will demonstrate a unique 
discourse that originated and evolved along with the development of nuclear power and 
anti-nuclear power efforts.
This study will not focus specifically on elements of the anti-nuclear movement 
(leadership, organization, life-cycle, etc.) and how that movement changed over three
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decades. Rather, this study will be a historical examination of the rhetorical progression of 
discourse generate by anti-nuclear power efforts. As Riches and Sillars (1980) suggest, 
"the longitudinal, comprehensive study of a social movement is the paradigmatic ideal. 
These studies can provide fundamental insights into relationships between rhetoric and 
history, between rhetoric and its predecessors, among competing rhetorics within a 
movement, and among opposing rhetorics." (p. 281) Thus, the historical investigation is 
evolutionary; it emphasizes rhetorical change over time.
The study of rhetoric using historical methods was pioneered by Leland M. Griffin. 
In a 1952 essay he observed that a theory of the rhetoric of social movements can best be 
generated when it is grounded in the history of movement rhetoric. It would, in fact, be 
safe to assume that few theoretical arguments dealing with the rhetoric of social 
movements have ignored history altogether. The quality of such arguments are likely 
enhanced when supported by detailed historical case studies rather than a few selected 
examples fi"om different moments in time.
Griffin's historical perspective suggests four possible approaches for the scholar 
who might undertake historical investigation; 1) the period study, 2) the regional-period,
3) the case study, and 4) the movement study. In following Griffin's perspective, this 
study is not intended to be an exercise in theory building and will not seek to develop or 
advance a particular theory on anti-nuclear power rhetoric or movement. Rather, it will 
follow a historical case study approach to explore opposition rhetoric associated with 
nuclear power development from 1945 until 1979.
In discussing and elaborating on Griffin's essay. The Rhetoric of Historical
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Movements. Edwin Black (1965) observed, "For many purposes there can be no quarrel 
with Griffin’s historically relative frame of reference... It is, then, to the rhetorical historian 
that Griffin offers the greatest promise, "(p. 21)
Admittedly, historical examination and the construction of theory cannot easily be 
separated. However, as Andrews (1980) points out, historical inquiry is necessarily 
atheoretical in a fundamental way. The rhetorical historian's independence of theory must 
come through his or her willingness to examine the process of rhetorical influence without 
preconceived theoretical notions of how that process must have worked in particular cases 
(p. 275). This study is intended to follow Andrews' advice in adding to the existing body 
of knowledge about anti-nuclear power rhetoric without necessarily being tied to a 
preconceived theory.
In discussing history and theory in the study of social movements, Andrews also 
(1980) pointed out that the exciting, and frustrating, characteristic of a movement is that it 
moves, and what makes it move, in large measure, is the way language is manipulated to 
control or interpret events;
In this sense, rhetoric makes moving possible - moving in all directions, pushing, 
shoving, lurching forward and falling backward as the movement encounters its 
environment. Growing out of the environment, intruding into the environment, the 
social movement is simultaneously a rhetorical response and a rhetorical stimulus, (p. 
274)
Likewise, it will be argued and demonstrated in this study, that a characteristic of 
anti-nuclear power rhetoric is that it moves and progresses through time in a similar
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manner.
When commencing on a historical study, Andrews (1983) also insists that a 
historical perspective virtually dictates that a scholar embark upon a study with as few 
preconceived notions as possible. A historical study should yield a description and 
explanation of unique patterns of rhetorical behavior and the relationship of those patterns 
to the social environment in which they developed (p. 68). This investigation, when 
possible, will avoid presumptions about the rhetoric of the anti-nuclear power movement.
For this historical investigation of anti-nuclear power rhetoric, rhetoric will be 
rather broadly defined as the use of symbols to influence thought and action. Foss (1989) 
found that "rhetoric is communication; it is simply an old term for what is now commonly 
called communication - whenever we project a particular image to someone, attempt to 
persuade someone to believe what we do, or are influenced by a painting or a film to look 
at the world in a new way, we are involved in rhetoric." (p. 4) Therefore the rhetoric of 
the anti-nuclear movement to be investigated during this case study includes speeches, 
essays, excerpts from journals, newspaper and magazine articles and historical accounts of 
the anti-nuclear movement.
JUSTMCATION
The rhetoric of the anti-nuclear movement deserves investigation. This effort is 
justified by its potential contribution to our overall understanding of the historical behavior 
of social movements and of rhetoric in general. As Hart (1976) points out, many historical 
studies will be part of the slow, steady accumulation of confirming evidence for some
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large hypothesis, a journeyman's labors. Darsey (1991) found that the energy required 
merely to characterize the data for these studies may force their authors to content 
themselves with achieving accurate and precise description, a kind of rhetorical chapter to 
a book someone else will edit.
In light of these ideas, the rhetoric of the anti-nuclear power movement in the 
United States may be an especially useful case study for adding to the existing body of 
knowledge on movement rhetoric. Furthermore, as a candidate for a case study, it has no 
confusing predecessors, a well-defined point of origin, easily definable sections and an 
abundance of documents containing rhetorical records.
In examining historical investigations, Lucas (1980) observed that among the kinds 
of case studies that need to be undertaken, perhaps the foremost are ones that deal 
exactingly, not just with some facet or another of movement rhetoric, but with the rhetoric 
of individual movements from inception through culmination.
One advantage of such a thorough approach is that it compels the scholar to treat 
the movement and its rhetoric as a temporal process, rather than as static or individual 
periods. Another advantage is that it encourages the scholar to consider the full 
complement of movement rhetoric, rather than to focus on a single set of addresses or the 
discourse of a prominent leader in the movement.
A third advantage of the comprehensive historical approach is that it allows the 
scholar to see the rhetoric of a social movement in its full complexity. Although individual 
studies exist that deal with particular aspects of movement rhetoric, there is not a good 
sense of the significance of those aspects together.
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Finally, justification for this case study is derived from the fact that social 
movements have been major forces of change and resistance to change throughout 
American history. Stewart (1983) regards this fact alone as justifying the study of social 
movement rhetoric. However, the realization that social movements rely primarily upon 
rhetoric to bring about or to resist change demands continued studies of social movement 
rhetoric. Lucas (1980) remarked that imaginative and resourceful analysis of the 
discourse of such historical moments would not only be valuable in its own right, but 
could appreciably enrich our developing theoretical understanding of movement rhetoric in 
general.
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
There are three areas of literature reviewed for the purposes of this study; 1) 
studies focusing on historical investigations of social movements and rhetoric; 2) sources 
which contain nuclear-power rhetoric or historical descriptions of the development of 
nuclear power; and 3) studies on which the methodology of this case study will be based. 
Since this investigation is primarily a historical case study of anti-nuclear power rhetoric, 
the bulk of literary sources will be historical, rather than theoretical.
Historical Social Movements 
Griffin's (1952) seminal essay The Rhetoric of Historical Movements, examines the 
development of social movement rhetoric in historical terms. Griffin argues that a social 
movement is a sustained process of social inference that "is dynamic, and has its 
beginning, its progressions, and its terminations, so the rhetorical component of the
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movement is dynamic, and has its inception, its development, and its consummation" (p. 
347).
Andrews (1980) points out that "in the thirty years since Griffin's essay was 
published, the study of social movements by rhetorical scholars has become extensive and 
serious." (p. 280) In examining history and theory in the study of rhetoric in social 
movements, Andrews found that "by recognizing the distinctive nature of their scholarly 
labors, rhetorical historians and rhetorical theorists can engage in research productive of a 
deeper understanding of the rhetoric of social movements." (p. 281)
In discussing future areas of research in the area of social movements, Lucas 
(1980) asserts that among the kinds of case studies that need to be undertaken, "perhaps 
foremost are ones that deal exactingly, not just with some facet or another of movement 
rhetoric, but with the rhetoric of individual movements from inception through 
culmination." (p. 264)
The historical perspective in the study of social movements is further examined by 
Andrews in a special issue of the Central States Speech Journal (1983). In providing 
overview of the historical approach, Andrews found that historical investigation may lead 
to a theoretical explanation to encompass the many rhetorical interactions inherent in 
movements:
In the meantime, historical scholarship must continue to produce, untainted by 
theoretical restraints, movement studies of depth and substance sufficient enough in 
and of themselves to shed some light on the intricacies of social change, and complete 
enough to provide meaningful insights to inform the theorists' always developing
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conceptions, (p.69)
During the course of this study, additional sources will be utilized in order to gain 
information concerning the historical study of social movements and movement rhetoric. 
Of the published studies that focus on the rhetorical or historical aspects of social 
movements, two have been particularly helpful in the development of this case study. One 
article investigates the rhetoric surrounding nuclear power over a 40-year period as a 
context for understanding the formation of public opinion on nuclear power (Gamson and 
Modigliani, 1989). The other source (Darsey, 1991) is a similar historical study which 
examines the rhetoric of gay liberation over a 13-year period. Both studies will be 
explored in greater detail in a subsequent section of this literature review.
Historical and Rhetorical Material
The first category of literature provides an understanding of the development of 
social movements or the development of the anti-nuclear power movement in the United 
States. In this category, several texts have been particularly useful including. Persuasion 
and Social Movements (Stewart, Smith, and Denton, 1994), Ideologv. Interest Group 
Formation^ and the New Left (Cohen, 1988), Human Communication as Narration:
Toward a Philosophy of Reason. Value, and Action (Fisher, 1987), and Everything is 
Changing: Contemporary U.S. Movements in Historical Perspective (DeLeon. 1988).
In addition to the texts, one article by Farrel and Goodnight (1981) was particular 
helpful in researching rhetoric associated with nuclear power. Through a detailed 
reconstruction of the discourse following the accident at Three Mile Island, the authors 
concluded that, “the inadequacies of accidental rhetoric at Three Mile Island point to a
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failure larger than the technical breakdown of 1979: the failure of technical reason itself to 
offer communication practices capable of mastering the problems of our age” (p.271).
As with many such case studies, additional historical and rhetorical information can 
come from numerous sources which are admittedly pro or anti-nuclear power in tone.
This second category includes literature sources which are decidedly anti-nuclear in tone 
but which are also a valuable source of historical and rhetorical information. An excellent 
account of the development of nuclear power from an anti-nuclear perspective is given by 
Berger (1976) in his book. Nuclear Power: The Unlivable Option. Berger details why 
nuclear energy should be discarded for environmentally friendly alternative energy sources 
such as wind and solar power.
In a similar book. The Menace of Atomic Energv. Nader and Abbotts (1977) delve 
into much greater detail to demonstrate the technological and financial faults of nuclear 
power. In examining the development of nuclear power, Nader, a self-proclaimed nemesis 
of nuclear power, and Abbotts explore what they consider to be the intrinsic technical and 
financial problems with nuclear power as well as sources of energy that could be used as 
alternatives.
In No Nukes: everybody's guide to nuclear power, Gyorgy (1979) essentially 
provides a primer on anti-nuclear movement in the United States. She explores the 
historical development of nuclear weapons and nuclear power along with the development 
of the anti-nuclear movement. Although Gyorgy focuses primarily on the overall anti- 
nuclear movement, she still provides some specific examples of anti-nuclear power 
rhetoric and history. Likewise, The Anti-nuclear Movement, by Price (1982) examines the
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development of the anti-nuclear movement against the backdrop of nuclear weapons and 
power development.
Additional sources of anti-nuclear power rhetoric and history include those 
information materials, primers, and position papers distributed by groups opposed to 
nuclear power development. Among this literature is information distributed by the Sierra 
Club, John Birch Society, Ralph Nader's Critical Mass Project, Citizens Alert and Public 
Citizen. Further information has been found in newspaper, magazine and journal articles 
reporting on nuclear power.
A subsequent (third) category of literature examines the development of nuclear 
power in more objective terms and investigates both pro and anti-nuclear power points of 
view. Among these sources are Del Sesto's (1979) Science. Politics, and Controversy: 
Civilian Nuclear Power in the United States. Global Fission: The Battle Over Nuclear 
Power by Falk (1982), and Decline and Fail: The Ailing Nuclear Power Industry by Stoler 
(1985). Public Reactions to Nuclear Waste by Dunlap, Kraft and Rosa (1993) provides a 
look at the public's reaction to the disposal of nuclear waste. As part of that examination, 
the book provides an excellent and useful exploration of the public's reaction to the 
development of nuclear power.
The fourth category presents literature which contains rhetoric and historical 
information and is more pro-nuclear power in orientation. Grant (1988) provides an 
effective and humorous case for the continued use of nuclear power in the United States in 
Trashing Nuclear Power. He also examines and systematically debunks what he considers 
to be the most pervasive anti-nuclear power myths in the United States.
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Cohen (1983) provides a more functional and pragmatic defense for the continued 
use and development of nuclear power in Before It's Too Late: A Scientists Case For 
Nuclear Energy He details several of the misimderstandings and myths associated with 
nuclear power and attempts to familiarize the reader with the risks of nuclear energy as 
opposed to other forms of energy.
Additional types of literature include numerous editions of Nuclear Industry.
(1995) a trade publication from the Nuclear Energy Institute, a public relations a lobbying 
organization funded by the nuclear power industry. Additional Nuclear Energy Institute 
information includes pamphlets, back-grounders, positions papers, and primers on the 
development of nuclear power.
A similar organization, the U.S. Council For Energy Awareness, provided Nuclear 
Energy: The First 50 Years (1992) as well as additional pamphlets and background 
information on the benefits and development of nuclear power.
The final category of literature includes newspapers, magazine, and journal articles 
taken from numerous national publications, including, in part, the New York Times. Los 
Angglgs.Tim.gs, OKggnian, Sgattlg Post, Time Magazine. Newsweek. Smithsonian 
Magazine, and New York Times Magazine.
Studies Used As Bases Of Methodology
In reviewing literature for this case study, two studies appear useful as the basis for 
a methodology for the investigation of the development of anti-nuclear rhetoric. In 
examining the rhetoric surrounding nuclear power, Gamson and Modigliani (1989) writes, 
"The Clamshell Alliance. The China Syndrome. Images of cooling towers at Three Mile
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Island. Chernobyl is everywhere. These are the nuggets from public discourse on nuclear 
power that most of us instantly recognize " (p. I)
Their investigation traces the careers of interpretive packages on nuclear energy in 
the media over a 40-year period and uses that information as a context for understanding 
the formation of public opinion and the construction of meaning. They postulate that 
nuclear power, like every other issue, has its own unique culture. Within that culture there 
is an ongoing discourse that evolves over time, providing interpretations and meanings 
about nuclear power events for the public. On issues such as nuclear power, there are also 
competing interpretations, or packages, available within the culture. Interpretive 
packages, or simply packages, represent a particular set of feelings, beliefs or attitudes 
about an issue.
Interpretive packages are not stagnant - they "ebb and flow in prominence and are 
constantly revised and updated to accommodate new events." (Gamson and Modigliani, 
1989, p.2) Thus, as new events combine with the experiences, opinions and 
predispositions individuals use to construct meaning, packages evolve into new 
interpretations of issues.
One such package which the authors named Progress is traced across a 40-year 
period on television network news, major magazine accounts, editorial cartoons, and 
syndicated columns. The Progress package represents early beliefs that nuclear power is 
absolutely safe and frames the nuclear power issue in terms of society's commitment to 
technological development and economic growth.
Gamson and Modigliani discovered that the Progress package evolved over time in
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the media to represent more of a Devil's Bargain package. Devil's Bargain represents the 
idea that nuclear power was cheap and mostly clean, but also inherently dangerous at the 
same time. This evolution may have occurred when older Americans, who were used to 
only the Progress package in the media, were exposed to different interpretive packages 
(different beliefs and opinions of nuclear power) in the 1960s and 1970s, which 
consequently led to opinions more reflective of the Devil's Bargain package.
In a study which also investigates the rhetoric of social movements in a historical 
context, Darsey (1991) examines the rhetoric of gay liberation from 1977 through 1990. 
Darsey developed a historical methodology that used catalytic events as markers of 
rhetorical eras. Catalytic events are moments in the life of a movement that provide the 
appropriate conditions for discourse. Such events (1) were historical rather than 
rhetorical, (2) were non-tactical, (3) achieved tremendous significance for the movement, 
and (4) precede rhetorical responses that constitute demonstrably discrete, internally 
homogeneous rhetorical eras.
In this study and an earlier study that examines the rhetoric of the gay liberation 
movement from its inception in 1948, Darsey identifies additional catalytic events and 
rhetorical eras that correspond to periods in the gay liberation movement. His discussions 
are based on a value analysis of selected samples of discourse with attention limited to the 
five most frequently coded value appeals in each period.
METHODOLOGY
Foss (1989) observes that in some instances, the question the critic is asking and
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the nature of the artifact being analyzed require the development of method for answering 
the question that does not rely on constructs, outlines, or theories developed by other 
rhetorical scholars, (p. 18) Although this study will not seek to follow or advance any 
specific critical theory, a novel method will be employed to examine three decades of anti- 
nuclear power rhetoric. This method will utilize a combination of two existing historical 
methods utilized by Gamson and Modigliani and Darsey.
A combination of these two historical methods would, as Munshaw (1973) 
explains, ofifer a helpful starting point for articulating relationships between time and 
discourse. This amalgamation of methods will include identifying catalytic events in the 
development (history) of nuclear power but not the identification of specific accompanying 
rhetorical eras or corresponding value appeals as in Darsey's study. Rather, rhetorical 
packages, similar to the Progress package identified by Gamson and Modigliani will be 
identified as following each of the catalytic events in specific historical periods. Catalytic 
events will be historical events in the development of nuclear power which resulted in anti- 
nuclear power rhetoric or achieved significance for anti-nuclear power efforts.
Gamson and Modigliani identified the progression of interpretive packages through 
the investigation of media discourse as artifacts. Foss remarks that the artifact may be any 
instance of symbol use that is of interest to the scholar and seems capable of generating 
insights about rhetorical processes (p. 11).
This investigation will use numerous types of information as sources of rhetorical 
artifacts. While earlier historical investigations concentrate primarily on media discourse, 
this study will implement additional sources of information including historical
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publications, speeches, journals, congressional records and information literature provided 
by both pro and anti-nuclear organizations. This investigation will not use rhetorical 
artifacts from films, songs or personal interviews.
This investigation begins with the inception of the atomic age in 1945 and spans a 
34-year period to the nuclear reactor accident at Three Mile Island in 1979. During the 
examination of these three-decades, five distinctive catalytic events in the development of 
nuclear power with corresponding historical periods will be investigated: 1) 1945 to 
1952, 2) 1953 to 1962, 3) 1963 to 1972, 4) 1973 to 1978, and 5) 1979. This 
sectioning of periods by catalytic event should provide useful entry points into 34-years of 
nuclear power development and anti-nuclear power rhetoric.
Following a historical overview of each period a corresponding interpretive 
package will be identified and named for each period. If such packages are identified, this 
study also intends to explore how, and possibly why each package changed or remained 
unchanged in different periods. Each catalytic event, historical period and corresponding 
package will be introduced as a chapter within this thesis.
Period number one begins with a catalytic event which occurred on August 6,
1945 - the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Japan - and continues until the year 1952. 
Although it might be argued that the atomic age began with the first successful test of an 
atomic weapon on July 16, 1945, public awareness of the atomic age did not began with 
that test, but with the images of sudden and enormous destruction in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki.
The second period essentially begins on December 8, 1953 with Dwight D.
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Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" speech before the United Nations and covers nearly a 
decade until the year 1962. This period includes events which are often referred to as the 
beginning of the age of commercial nuclear power in the United States. In 1954, for 
instance, the Atomic Energy Commission began a five-year reactor development program 
with private power utilities. And the first contract for a nuclear power plant was signed in 
the summer of 1956.
The third period continues with the year 1963 and the signing the Limited Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty, which ended all atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons between the 
United States and U.S.S.R. This period also spans nearly an entire decade until the year 
1972.
The fourth period begins in 1973 with the Arab oil embargo of the United States 
during the 1973 - 1974 Yom Kippur war between Egypt and Israel, and extends until the 
year 1978. During this five-year period, the United States in an energy crises, rushes to 
develop alternative sources of energy and diminish reliance on foreign crude oil. The 
United States Government also begins to wrestle with the issues of promoting and 
regulating an emerging nuclear power industry.
The fifth period begins, and essentially concludes in the year 1979 with what many 
consider to be the watershed event in the opposition of nuclear power - the accident at the 
Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania nuclear power station on March 28. This period 
examines events only during the year 1979 and is the completion of the 34-year period for 
this case study.
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General Observations and Conclusion 
"The detailing of key value appeals in the gay rights rhetoric for a thirteen-year 
period...," writes Darsey (1991), "allows us to make some observations about changes in 
this discourse over more than four decades."(p. 58) Similar observations and discussion 
of anti-nuclear power rhetoric will be made available at the end of this case study, which 
examines three decades and five periods of anti-nuclear power rhetoric in the United 
States.
The case study methodology of examining anti-nuclear power rhetoric in terms of 
the historical/catalytic events which led to its development should prove to be a very 
useful and enlightening technique during this investigation. It is hoped that the case study 
methodology will lead to the identification of unique interpretive packages in the 
development of anti-nuclear power rhetoric from 1945 until 1979. Further this technique 
should allow the examiner to draw several conclusions about how anti-nuclear power 
rhetoric has changed or remained unchanged over the three decade period of examination.
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Period One
Upon the earth the gods placed the first women. And to her was given the name 
Pandora. On her life's walk she came upon a Box, which she was forbidden to open. 
Pandora did not obey; fi'om her Box was cast forth all evil to this world. Within the 
box only the legacy of hope remained.
"OBgk Mythology
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
On the morning of August 6, 1945, three B-29 Superfortress bombers flying at
31,000 feet passed over the city of Hiroshima, Japan. Approximately half way across the 
city, the lead bomber, Enola Gay released a single four-ton bomb nicknamed "Little Boy." 
The captain of the Enola Gay, Lt. Col. Paul Tibbets, struggled to control his suddenly 
lighter Superfortress as all three bombers immediately turned away from the center of the 
city.
On the ground in Hiroshima, no civil defense alarms had sounded when the planes 
appeared in the morning sky. A radio announcer on duty had received word that three 
enemy planes had been sighted, but he had momentarily paused to check his notes instead 
of grabbing the microphone. " 'Military command announces three enemy planes...' He 
never finished. Outside, a teacher supervising a team of schoolgirl laborers said. Oh, 
there's a b...' They looked up and saw the eye of death." (Gray, 1995, p.24)
"Little Boy," which had been dropped by the Enola Gay at 8:15 and 30 seconds in 
the morning, detonated 43 seconds later at 1,900-feet above Hiroshima with 
a reportedly greenish-white brilliance. Temperatures at the hypocenter, the point below
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the explosion, swelled to 7200 degrees Fahrenheit - within a mile of the blast the surfaces 
of objects instantly rose to more than 1000 degrees Fahrenheit. A shockwave of super­
heated air swept out from the hypocenter at 400 kilometers per hour. Nearly 20,000 
people were killed instantly. A thick cloud of grey smoke and gas quickly covered the 
city.
In the Enola Gay, Tibbets and his crew watched the blast. "A bright light filled the 
plane." Tibbets later wrote in his journal. "We turned back to look at Hiroshima. The city 
was hidden by that awful cloud...boiling up, mushrooming." (Thomas, 1995, p. 16) For a 
moment, no one in the plane spoke - then everyone was talking. "Look at that! Look at 
that! Look at that!' exclaimed co-pilot Robert Lewis pounding on Tibbets's shoulder. 
Lewis said he could tasted atomic fission; it tasted like lead. Then he turned away to 
write in his journal, 'My God, what have we done?"' (Thomas, 1995, p. 16)
At 1.2 kilometers from the hypocenter of the Hiroshima blast, people in the open 
were instantly burned to death. At four kilometers the heat was 20-times more intense 
than that from the sun, and exposed wood and skin blackened and peeled. Apart from the 
blast, shock wave, and ensuing fire storm, there was ionizing radiation which is now 
referred to as fallout. Approximately sixty percent of the city had been destroyed outright,
71,000 people had been killed, and another 68,000 injured. Three days later, an atomic 
bomb nicknamed “Fat Man” was dropped on the city of Nagasaki with similar devastating 
results. It appeared that science had opened Pandora's Box and unleashed its contents 
onto an unsuspecting world.
The bombings were the culmination of the years-long, multi-billion dollar effort
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code named the Manhattan Project. Still, from a scientific perspective, they did not 
exemplify a pivotal turning point in the search for control over natural forces in the 
universe. All the science and technology employed in the bombings had previously been 
discovered and demonstrated in a long history of experiments which dated back to the 
early 1900s.
From a societal perspective, however, the bombings signified a critical turning 
point in the way in which the public would discover the power of the atom. Up until the 
atomic bombings, most nuclear developments had been shrouded in the cloak of wartime 
secrecy. Nuclear reactors had actually been constructed and secretly used since the early 
1940s (as part of the Manhattan Project) to create plutonium for the Trinity and Nagasaki 
atomic bombs. Now the technology and science of the atom could no longer be kept 
hidden from the public consciousness.
Technically, the atomic age dawned on July 16, 1945 with the first explosion of an 
atomic bomb in New Mexico. However, Americans were unaware of the test, because the 
Army released the following statement:
Several inquiries have been received concerning a heavy explosion which occurred on 
the Alamogordo Air Base reservation this morning. A remotely located ammunition 
magazine containing a considerable amount of high explosives and pyrotechnics 
exploded...Weather conditions affecting the content of gas shells exploded by the blast 
may make it desirable for the Army to evacuate temporarily a few civilians from their 
homes. (Hilgartner, Bell & O'Connor, 1982, p. 34)
Consequently, public awareness of the atom's power did not begin with the New
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Mexico test or the "household" utilization of nuclear power, but with reports and images 
of sudden nuclear destruction. For society, a nuclear genie of sorts had been released 
from its bottle and "its potent implications were laid bare for all to see." (Falk, 1982, p. 16) 
According to Falk, News Chronicle reporter Robert Waitham captured the primary 
reaction in the United States following the bombings:
In the newspapers and on the radio you read and hear today such passages as this: 
'Yesterday we clinched the victory in the Pacific, but we sowed the whirlwind...With 
such god-like power under man's imperfect control, we face a fiightfiil 
responsibility. .We have narrowed down the choice to one of the end of war or the end 
of humanity.' (p. 17)
Following the bombings, the Japanese government was forced to sue for peace 
and to accept the United States' demand that it surrender unconditionally. Within two 
months of the nuclear attacks, Japan had surrendered and the war in the Pacific had ended. 
A new, nuclear era was beginning.
Many scientists who helped develop the weapons were dismayed at what their 
research had yielded and sought only to find a way by which the nuclear genie could 
somehow be recaptured and placed back into its bottle. But other, more pragmatic 
scientists realized that once the genie had been released from bottle, it would be free upon 
the world forever. Some scientists also reasoned that the atom's power was not 
necessarily beyond the control of mankind. The energy of the atom, they proposed, might 
be harnessed to power ships, planes, and electric generating plants, to heat and cool cities, 
to run industries, and to make life better for mankind.
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Few of these "true believers" were more enthusiastic about atomic power than 
Glenn Seaborg. As a Manhattan Project scientist, Seaborg had signed a secret report to 
the Secretary of War urging that the power of the atomic bomb be demonstrated to the 
Japanese by dropping it on a barren island rather than on an inhabited city. Seaborg 
believed that civilization's future was in the hands of the nuclear scientists, who might 
possibly build a new world through nuclear technology. He envisioned a world of atomic- 
powered abundance and saw nuclear energy as a magic power that could free mankind 
from any potential limitations.
Seaborg would, in fact, discuss at length the new science - predicting a future in 
which millions of homes would be heated and lit by the power of a single nuclear reactor 
and ships and planes could sail or fly almost forever on the energy contained in a pocket- 
sized piece of plutonium. It would be a future in which the whole planet could be virtually 
made over, mountain ranges leveled, deserts made to bloom and rivers controlled by the 
forces that he and the other nuclear scientists had helped to put at man's disposal.
The possibilities at that point however, were still largely on the drawing board. 
Because of the war, few of the scientists involved in nuclear research had given much 
thought to the problems of designing nuclear power reactors or of turning their other 
visions of cheap, abundant energy into reality. Nevertheless, following the war, a 
majority in the scientific field shared Seaborg's idealistic vision of the possibilities of a 
future dominated by nuclear power.
The result was a conspicuous body of rhetoric in the early atomic age which was 
overly optimistic and bordering on science fiction in nature. "It was natural," wrote Jim
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Falk, "that politicians and members of the technical community most intimately connected 
with the development of the nuclear bomb would be anxious to stress any positive benefits 
that might stem fi’om it and to counter any criticism of their work." (p. 16)
Additionally, the extraordinary results of the scientist's work, and the swiftness in 
which the atomic weapons were developed from theory to practice created a heightened 
optimism in the ability of modem science to safely control the atomic genie. Even as 
Hiroshima still burned from the atomic bombing. Secretary of War Stimson announced in 
an August 6, 1945 press statement that atomic fission held;
great promise for sweeping developments by which our civilization may be enriched 
when peace comes...With the evidence presently at hand...it appears inevitable that 
many useful contributions to the well-being of mankind will ultimately flow from these 
discoveries when the world situation makes it possible for science and industry to 
concentrate on these aspects. (Hilgartner, Bell & O’Conner, 1982, p.38)
Stimson and others in the government were not alone sharing their optimism with 
the public. Many of the scientists and technicians involved in the development of the 
atomic bombs publicly speculated about the potentiality of nuclear power. Archetypal of 
these frequently fanciful speculations are the following excerpts from a 1945 edition of the 
News Chronicle newspaper:
The horizon is now limitless, and questions which before were relegated to the realm 
of fiction for the first time become practicable and even imminent. At the threshold of 
boundless energy, man must reconsider his position in nature and his social relations. 
(Falk, 1982, p. 18)
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Other speculations focused on the possible atomic exploration of space, predicting
that;
The old question of what lies on the other side of the moon may finally be 
solved . These are questions which atomic energy driving rockets into space areas 
hitherto veiled even to the telescope, may answer. (Falk, 1982, p. 18)
Most atomic power forecasts, however, focused on the seemingly unlimited applications 
nuclear energy might have on earth:
This may well mean revolutionary changes in industrial power. If atomic energy can 
be controlled as well as released, all other forms of power - coal, petrol, water power - 
may become obsolete necessitating complete changes in the industrial pattern. This is 
the key question: How long will it be before we can release the energy so that we can 
guide it? (Falk, 1982, p. 18)
William L. Laurence, who became an enthusiastic promoter of atomic power, 
wrote in a 1948 article in the Woman's Home Companion. "Today we are standing at a 
major crossroads. One fork on the road has a signpost inscribed with the magic word 
'Paradise'; the other fork also has a signpost bearing the word 'Doomsday.'" (Stoler, 1985, 
p.33) Laurence trusted that humanity would find a way to avoid going down the path 
marked "Doomsday." Using nuclear energy he argued, humanity had "a chance to enter a 
new Eden,...abolishing disease and poverty, anxiety and fear"(Stoler, 1985, p.33).
Everything would get better and better; there would be better, finer and more 
nourishing plants, better, cheaper, and more abundant fertilizer; better and richer soils, 
farms, and gardens; better metals and machines; better and finer clothing and homes;
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better men and women. (Stoler, 1985, p.34) Summing up this "turning point in the history 
of civilization," Lawrence claimed; "Such power plants could, in short, make the dream of 
the earth as a Promised Land come true in time for many of us already bom to see and 
enjoy it" (Stoler, 1985, p.34).
As pointed out be Daniel Ford, the widespread optimistic tone as to the boundless 
benefits fi’om the power of the atom were superbly summed up in a 1945 book titled 
Atomic Energy in the Coming Era:
Planes carrying several thousand passengers, with as much cabin space as a luxury 
finer will make non-stop flights fi’om New York to India or Australia ... Instead of 
filling the gasoline tank of your automobile two or three times a week, you will travel 
for a year on a pellet of atomic energy the size of a vitamin pill...
The same pill will be enough to heat your house for the winter ... The day is 
gone when nations will fight for o il... No baseball game will be called off on account 
of rain ... No airplane will by-pass an airport because of fog. No city will experience a 
winter of traffic jam because of heavy snow...
Universal and perpetual peace will reign in the Era of Atomic Energy for three 
reasons... First: With energy as abundant as the air we breathe, there will be no longer 
any reason to fight for oil or coal. Second: By using atomic energy to mine the ocean 
for its vast mineral content, every nation will be able to obtain easily all the raw 
materials that it needs. Third: With even more powerful atomic bombs than those 
dropped on Japan, war will become so destructive that no nation will dare begin one...
Changes full as great as these will be ushered in with the widespread use of
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atomic energy. To begin with it will completely change the costs of production. 
Cheaper cost of production will mean more plentiful production. It will also mean 
new types of production. Processes now commercially impossible because of the cost 
in electric power or heat would be too great will become possible at once. (p. 11)
In the midst of this enthusiastic environment, however, there were also those who 
doubted the seemingly fantastic possibilities of the power of the atom. Toward the end of 
the war, for instance, a Manhattan Project task force had been asked to develop a policy 
on postwar nuclear research. Headed by R.C. Tolman, a dean at the California Institute of 
Technology, the committee was not enthusiastic about the commercial applications of the 
atom. Indeed, its report concluded: "The development of fission piles solely for the 
production of power for ordinary commercial use does not appear economically sound nor 
advisable fi-om the point of view of preserving national resources." (Ford, 1982, p. 24) 
Overall, the committee felt that fissionable uranium was too valuable to use for generating 
commercial electric power.
For a group of scientists who had become deeply concerned about the way 
technical expertise had been applied to devastate Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there was an 
additional concern: would the mass production of nuclear reactors inevitably lead to the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons? To prevent such a proliferation, scientists like Leo 
Szilard, a co discover of the chain reaction process that led to the development of the 
atomic bomb, openly pressed for a moratorium on the further development of nuclear 
energy. Although other scientists joined Szilard in voicing their concerns about the 
development of nuclear power, most others in the scientific community considered a
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complete moratorium too high a price to pay for security against possible atomic attack.
For a different group of scientists, concern extended beyond the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. In particular, some believed that ionizing radiation presented a hazard 
only partly understood and requiring investigation before any decision to commit to 
nuclear power. In 1946, Dr. Herman Lisco warned in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
that the problem of radiation, "has not been discussed with the frankness that it requires." 
(Falk, p. 92) Lisco's concern was a prophetic statement, but at the dawn of the atomic age 
it was nearly a voice crying in the wilderness.
It was not only the scientists and economists who raised doubts about nuclear 
power in the early years of the atomic age. There were also members of the public who, 
at first, openly supported the development of nuclear power, only to subsequently become 
anti-nuclear power activists. David Dellinger, an early pacifist and antiwar activist, said of 
his decision to first support, then oppose nuclear power:
Now that the government was contemplating production of hydrogen bombs, a few 
dozen activists gathered in Washington to try to help the country change its thinking. 
We lobbied, held press briefings and public meetings, fasted for a week, and sat in the 
Atomic Energy Commission's offices. We urged discontinuance of all development, 
testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons. We called instead for the peaceful uses 
of atomic fission through development of nuclear energy.
In succumbing to the lure of nuclear power we were influenced by our belief in 
the possibilities for human betterment through scientific discovery, and by our desire 
to see the burdens of poverty lifted from the destitute and hard-pressed, as the early
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advocates of nuclear power announced they would be. Also, rather than only saying 
no to something negative and diverse, we were eager to be able to say yes to 
something positive and uniting. We wanted to remind ourselves and our opponents 
that, as George Meredith once said. The things that separate us from our fellows are 
as nothing compared to those that unite us with all humanity.'
These were honorable intentions. They remain central to the practice and 
philosophy of the anti-nuclear, pro-renewable-energy movement today, though anyone 
whose information is limited to the mass media might not realize it. But we should 
have known better, even in 1948, than to believe what we were told about nuclear 
energy, because we knew that the government had lied to us about the necessity for 
dropping the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. To save thousands of American lives 
that would have been lost in an inch-by-inch, mile-by-mile invasion of Japan, it had 
been said, we had to destroy Japanese lives. What the government failed to mention 
was that Japan had already sent out peace feelers, knowing that its military position 
was hopeless. (Kaku & Trainer, 1982, p. 234)
These dissenting views, no matter how partisan against the atom, never proved to 
be more than the minority opinion during the dawning of the atomic age. The majority of 
those in the scientific community and public realm continued to share Seaborg's quixotic 
vision of the atom. For the majority who did not oppose the development of nuclear 
power, the emerging atomic age would be a time when,
a very few individuals working a few hours a day at very easy tasks in the central 
atomic power plant will provide all the heat, light and power required by a community
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and these utilities will be so cheap that their cost can hardly be reckoned. (Ford, p.30) 
But even had scientists, economists and the public been completely united in their 
enthusiasm for nuclear power, the path to the nuclear age of which they dreamed was 
anything but unswerving. Congress and the Truman administration may, as did the 
President himself, have wanted to make a blessing of nuclear power. But a number of 
obstacles stood in the way of this goal, among them the emerging Cold War between the 
United States and its former ally, the U.S.S.R.
Scientists also tended to sound as if they were writing science fiction when they 
testified on the commercial applications of nuclear power. But military men tended to 
sound as if they knew exactly what they were talking about when they discussed the 
possible military applications of the atom.
So it was hardly surprising that Congress, in passing the Atomic Energy Act of 
1946, stressed the possible military applications of the atom more than the potential 
commercial uses. The Atomic Energy Act was designed for the primary purpose of 
protecting atomic secrets so as to preserve America's monopoly on nuclear weapons and 
technology. It was also intended to establish an Atomic Energy Commission to provide 
civilian control over nuclear weaponry. As for the peaceful uses of atomic energy in the 
United States, the 1946 act mentioned them only in passing.
The Atomic Energy Commission, which officially came into existence in August 
1946, was almost instantly overwhelmed by its new responsibilities. For one thing, it 
found itself with more people and facilities than it knew how to handle. It had inherited 
fi’om the Manhattan Project a huge network of laboratories and manufacturing plants, not
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to mention more than 40,000 people. Deliberately scattered across the country, these 
facilities had no central management. Nor did they have great deal of uranium.
The mine in the Belgian Congo that had provided the uranium for the "Trinity," 
"Little Boy" and "Fat Man" bombs was nearly exhausted. The reactors used during the 
war for making plutonium were wearing out. The United States might have thought that 
it had a stockpile of atomic bombs ready for use. But as David Lilienthal, the Atomic 
Energy Commission's first chairman, reported to a rather stunned President Truman in the 
spring of 1947, the cupboard was bare. The United States had no nuclear weapons 
manufactured and ready for use. And it had very little uranium with which to make them.
But even before the development of the Soviet atomic bomb, the Atomic Energy 
Commission had not been ready to proceed at top speed with the development of atomic 
power reactors. A 1947 report by J. Robert Oppenheimer dampened some of the 
commission's enthusiasm for nuclear power plants by arguing that a more realistic 
evaluation of their prospects was necessary to balance popular misconception about them. 
Oppenheimer said that it did not appear hopeful "to use natural uranium directly as an 
adequate source of fuel for atomic power," and predicted that the development of 
plutonium reactors capable of producing enough fuel for the utility industry would take 
decades. (Ford, p.24)
Even Seaborg, ever the enthusiast where nuclear power was concerned, had to 
concede that Oppenheimer was right. As a member of the commission's full advisory 
committee, he concurred in a report in which the committee said that it did not see how it 
would be possible "under the most favorable circumstances to have any considerable
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portion of the present power supply of the world replaced by nuclear fuel before the 
exploration of twenty years." (Ford, p.24)
The fact that everyone - from Lilienthal and Seaborg to the people around the 
President - had to face was that scientific enthusiasm for nuclear power plants had waned. 
Most of the scientists involved with nuclear research were interested in studying the 
properties of atoms, not in the nuts and bolts of power plant design, which they 
considered "plumbing," and which they knew was not likely to win any of them Nobel 
prizes.
Seaborg had gone back to Berkeley after the war to work on discovering more 
new elements. Other scientists followed suit and returned to individual pursuits. The 
Atomic Energy Commission, however, remained reluctant to write off nuclear power. 
Leaders like Lilienthal feared that pulling the rug out from under public expectations might 
play into the hands of those who thought of the atom as exclusively military property and 
end civilian control of the commission. Lewis L. Strauss, who succeeded Lilienthal as 
commissioner, felt that admitting that nuclear power was a pipe dream would handicap the 
agency in the annual race for appropriations.
Understandably, the agency tried to have it both ways. It down-played nuclear 
energy, but insisted that work on the atom's military applications would ultimately lead to 
civilian applications, too. Its ploy was disingenuous. Bombs and reactors worked on 
vastly different principles. Weapons research might lead to a better understanding of the 
atom, which might prove valuable when researchers turned their attention to building 
power reactors. But in no way could weapons research be considered the other side of
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the coin to developing power reactors.
Work on the peacetime applications of nuclear power was pushed even farther into 
the background by work on the hydrogen bomb. The explosion of the first Soviet atomic 
bomb, which ended the American nuclear monopoly, added additional fuel to the search 
for a possible super weapon. The President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported the 
scientists' plans to prooed with its development.
The outbreak of the Korean conflict in 1950 provided additional impetus.
Working at full speed, the Atomic Energy Commission and its scientists proceeded with 
work on a thermonuclear device, exploding the first - the so-called "George Shot" - on the 
Pacific island of Enewetok on May 8,1951. In the following years, the Atomic Energy 
Commission followed this initial experiment with bigger and bigger thermonuclear devises.
The demonstration of what a hydrogen bomb could do horrified many Americans 
and frightened many of America's allies. Many people quickly forgot the postwar dream 
of the atom as the provider of cheap, abundant power. Instead, they saw it only as an 
agent of destruction (as they did initially at the end of the Second World War).
The prospect of the two postwar superpowers facing each other with hydrogen 
bombs impressed large numbers of Americans with the need to rehabilitate the atom and 
assure that its power would somehow be put to peaceful uses, not used to destroy cities in 
a war that even then people realized no one would win. The government was ready to 
explore the possibilities of the peaceful atom.
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PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION 
Interestingly, just as the test of the hydrogen bomb concludes the period from 
1945 to 1952, it was the use of two atomic weapons which also initiated the period. As 
perhaps the first catalytic event in the development of nuclear power, the dropping of two 
atomic bombs on Japan in August of 1945, essentially signaled the beginning of the atomic 
age in the United States.
After witnessing the destructive power of the bombs, it was natural that the 
potential development of nuclear power was at once embraced as a "peaceful" atom which 
would be harnessed to create a better standard of living for all mankind. The result was an 
early body of rhetoric virtually declaring there would be no end to the possible uses of 
nuclear power for mankind's betterment.
It was this idealized and frequently utopian view of an atomic-powered future 
which led authors Gamson and Modigliani to designate Progress as the dominant 
interpretive package during the early atomic age in the United States. In their 1989 study. 
Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach, they 
offered their description of the Progress package, which demonstrates the dominant 
attitude toward nuclear power development:
If the electric chair had been invented before the electric light, would we still be using 
kerosene lamps? There has always been resistance to technological progress by 
nervous Nellies who see only the problems and ignore the benefits. Resistance to 
nuclear energy development is the latest version of this irrational fear of progress and 
change, the expression of modem pastoralists and nuclear Luddites. Certainly nuclear
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energy development is not free of problems, but problems can be solved, as the history 
of technological progress shows. The failure to develop nuclear power will retard our 
economic growth and make us renege on our obligation to the poor and to future 
generations. If coercive Utopians prevent us from movang ahead now with nuclear 
energy, the next generation is likely to be sitting around in the dark blaming the 
utilities for not doing something this generation's officials would not let them do. (p.4) 
Gamson and Modigliani also propose that a dualism about nuclear power 
development is a the core of their Progress package. "We face the prospect either of 
destruction on a scale which dwarfs anything thus far reported," said a New York Times 
editorial a day after Hiroshima, "or of a golden era of social change which would satisfy 
the most romantic utopian." (p.4) Accordingly, either civilization would vanish in a 
cataclysmic nuclear holocaust, or the atomic future would be unimaginably bright (and 
inexpensive).
The general message of their Progress package then, appears to be not how 
quickly could America develop weapons of mass destruction. But how quickly could 
America embrace the challenge of making the atom a benevolent servant to produce for 
humankind "more comforts, more leisure, better health, more freedom and a much happier 
life." (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p. 4)
With the scientific optimism and dualism at the nucleus of their Progress package, 
the authors speculated that no substantial anti-nuclear power development rhetoric was 
offered during the early atomic age in the United States, and that:
there were certainly cautious skeptics challenging the utopian claims. But this is a
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debate within a frame, a disagreement over how fast and how easily the promise of 
nuclear energy will be realized. As long as the issue is framed as a choice between 
atoms for war and atoms for peace, it is hard to see who could be against nuclear 
power development, (p. 13)
The dualism at the core of anti-nuclear-power rhetoric, however, appears to 
indicate otherwise. It indicates that the available rhetoric on nuclear power likely 
represented two distinct viewpoints on nuclear power development, rather than a debate 
within a single viewpoint.
For nuclear power development to be a non-issue, the Progress package would 
have to have been basically unchallenged during the early atomic age. Yet scientists and 
others, although clearly a minority at the time, did openly voice concerns about the 
development of nuclear power, the dangers of the unknown effects of radiation and the 
possible economic impacts.
It is possible, then, that two packages characterize nuclear power development 
rhetoric in the early years of the atomic age. While the Progress package aptly provides 
evidence of much of the enthusiastic early rhetoric associated with the development of 
nuclear power, it does not completely accommodate and account for rhetoric which 
clearly demonstrates resistance to the development of nuclear power.
The rhetoric which first openly questioned or opposed the development of nuclear 
power was admittedly uncommon during the dawning of the atomic age. Nonetheless, 
that rhetoric was present and can be characterized by its own package, referred to as 
Pandora's Box for the Greek myth about the release of all evil onto the world by the first
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woman. The following passage, assembled from rhetorical vignettes from this period, 
illustrates the sentimentality of the Pandora's Box package:
Through the release of atomic energy, our generation has brought into the world the 
most revolutionary force since prehistoric man's discovery of fire. The splitting of the 
atom has moved man into a new dimension. What began as a weapon against one's 
enemies now may threaten the hand that wields it. This basic force of the universe 
cannot be fitted into outmoded concepts...Radioactivity in the environment may be 
irreversible. Once let out by man into the air, water or earth, it is here to stay, for the 
lifetime of these radioactive substances can run into thousands and millions of years. 
The problem of radiation has not been discussed with the frankness that it requires.
This first anti-nuclear power development package frames the development of 
nuclear power in terms of a technology and energy source poorly understood at the dawn 
of the atomic age. Pandora's Box reflects early viewpoints that something potentially 
adverse had been released by science onto the world, although the exact nature of that 
adversity was not completely understood by science or the public at the time. Those 
inside and outside the scientific community who initially resisted nuclear power 
development did so because it was a vastly unexplored technology with potential 
radiological hazards and costs that had not been earnestly researched.
Furthermore this rhetorical package suggests that once science had released the 
evils onto the world, they could not be returned to the box. Through its efforts, science 
had released a nuclear evil of sorts onto the world. Mankind, whether they wanted to or 
not, moved into a new age. The evil represented by nuclear weapons could not and would
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not ever be returned to Pandora’s Box. Consequently, it seemed unwise then to hastily 
embrace and rush toward the development of another potential evil, nuclear power, and 
free it upon the world forever as well.
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Period Two
The private electric companies did not jump into nuclear power. They were kicked in.
—Sam Day, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
At the onset of the second period, spanning nearly a decade from 1953 to 1962, images of 
the destructive power of nuclear weapons remained closely linked with efforts to develop nuclear 
power. In the closing days of the 1952 Presidential campaign, the United States conducted a test 
of a new weapon, far more powerful than the atomic device that had leveled Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki seven years earlier.
The awesome fireball that completely devoured a Pacific island a mile wide signaled the 
birth of the hydrogen bomb. The almost unimaginable destructive power added a new dimension 
to the arms race and left the American public looking for reassurance that the atom would be used 
peacefully to the benefit of all mankind.
Newly elected President Dwight D. Eisenhower was prepared to provide that assurance to 
Americans through the unveiling of his much awaited “Atoms for Peace” program. Speaking 
before the United Nations General assembly on December 8, 1953, Eisenhower announced that 
the United States was prepared to share the benefits of nuclear science and technology with the 
rest of the world.
Eisenhower acknowledged that atomic energy had been, and could be used to 
level entire cities and kill untold thousands. "But in a swords-into-plowshares approach borrowed
43
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from the Bible, he pledged to use the atom's power for peoples' benefit rather than destruction" 
(Stoler, 1985, p. 28). Eisenhower also asserted that the benefits of the atom could be realized in 
the present, that "the United States knows that the peaceful power from atomic energy is no 
dream of the future. That capability, already proved, is here - now, today. Nuclear power can 
provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world" (Ford, 1984, p. 40).
Nuclear power, Eisenhower conceded in his address, could feasibly be misused in the era 
of the peaceful atom. But, he insisted this abuse could also be prevented. "The U.S. pledges...to 
help solve the fearful atomic dilemma - to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by 
which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to 
his life" (Ford, p. 40).
Eisenhower's message before the United Nations Assembly virtually turned the phrase 
"Atoms for Peace" into a slogan of nearly religious significance to the American public. “Atoms 
for Peace” captured the hope that man kind would find a way to overcome the destructive 
potential of nuclear energy and utilize the power of the atom to realize the dream of unlimited 
material abundance.
More than just a description for an idealized future, however, “Atoms for Peace” also 
marked the beginning of a significant shift in America's nuclear energy development policy. 
Through his “Atoms for Peace” program, Eisenhower proposed the establishment of an 
international atomic energy authority that would distribute fissionable material to member nations 
and would:
devise methods whereby...fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful 
pursuits of mankind. Experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs
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of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities. A special purpose would be to 
provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world. Thus the 
contributing powers would be dedicating some of their strengths to serve the needs 
rather than the fears o f mankind.(Ford, p. 41)
Eisenhower's appeal and swords-into-plowshares approach of his proposal proved 
to be more than effective. Reacting to President Eisenhower’s call to action, the 
Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy drafted several new laws designed to 
promote the peaceful applications of nuclear power. The most significant of these new 
laws was an amended version of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.
The original act had strictly forbidden the private ownership of nuclear materials 
and had kept most nuclear technology secret. The 1954 Act called upon the Atomic 
Energy Commission to license private power utilities to build and operate nuclear power 
stations in the United States. And, as almost an afterthought, the law also charged the 
Atomic Energy Commission with the responsibility for protecting the health and safety of 
the public.
Under the 1954 act, the Commission would be responsible for encouraging private 
utilities to build and operate nuclear reactors across the country. The government would 
retain ownership of all nuclear fuel, but permit its use in privately owned power stations. 
The law also authorized the government to enter into bilateral agreements with other 
countries for the peaceful development of atomic power stations, and liberalized patent 
and secrecy provisions.
The 1954 Act also specifically prohibited the Atomic Energy Commission from
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selling electricity for profit and, in essence, becoming a power utility. What the law did 
not forbid, though, was that the Atomic Energy Commission stop overseeing the 
production of nuclear weapons. Thus, the Commission might help promote the use of 
atoms for peace, but under the terms of the 1954 law, it continued to develop them for 
war as well.
The Atomic Energy Commission wasted little time after the passage of the Act and 
launched what Daniel Ford of the Union of Concerned Scientists described as "the most 
ambitious construction program in the United States since the building of the railroads in 
the 19th century" (Stoler, 1985, p.29). Ford's description was not hyperbole. The Atomic 
Energy Commission projected that utilities would have 1000 nuclear power stations in 
operation in the United States by the year 2000.
Even with this ambitious schedule in mind, the Atomic Energy Commission still 
required an industrial partner to build the first commercial nuclear power station in the 
United States. "It had little trouble finding one," wrote author Peter Stoler. (p. 36) The 
Duquesne Light and Power Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania agreed to participate in 
the venture and offered the Commission a site on the Ohio River at a location named 
Shippingport. The commission accepted Duquesne's offer and the project went ahead.
The agreement between Duquesne Light and Power and the Commission 
demonstrated how President Eisenhower's “Atoms for Peace” program had given renewed 
hope to the possibility of a nuclear utopia. There would be nuclear powered planes, trains, 
ships, and rockets; nuclear energy would genetically alter crops and preserve grains and 
fish; nuclear reactors would generate cheap electricity.
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Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Lewis L. Strauss captured the seemingly 
unlimited potential of the atoms for peace vision in a speech to the National Association of 
Science Writers in 1954:
Transmission of the elements - unlimited power, ability to investigate the working of 
living cells by tracer atoms, the secret of photosynthesis about to be uncovered - these 
and a host of other results all in 15 short years [from 1954]. It is not too much to 
expect that our children will enjoy electrical energy too cheap to meter - will know of 
great periodic regional famines only as matters of history - will travel effortlessly over 
the seas and under them and through the air with a minimum of danger and at great 
speeds - and will experience a life span far longer than ours, as disease yields and man 
comes to understand what causes him to age. This is the forecast for an age of peace. 
(Hilgartner, Bell & O'Connor, 1982, p. 44)
With this utopian vision of the peaceful atom at its forefront, the age of 
commercial nuclear power came into being on Labor Day in 1954. It began when 
President Eisenhower appeared on national television from Denver, Colorado. 
"Eisenhower," wrote Stoler, "was not one of the nation's greatest speakers; his tortured 
syntax drove grammarians to distraction and journalists to bursts of parody. But the 
former general had a keen sense of public relations and knew the value of a good 
gesture"(Stoler, p. 16).
In his broadcast, Eisenhower made just one gesture. Waving a magic wand, he 
signaled an unmanned, radio-controlled bulldozer to begin breaking ground at 
Shippingport. As Stoler wrote. Life Magazine described the history-making scene;
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With a wave of a radioactive wand. President Eisenhower... transformed the bright 
hope for atomic power peaceable used into a solid certainty...When the counter's 
needle swung across the dial, it electrically set in motion, 1,300 miles away at 
Shippingport, Pa. plant site, an automatically controlled power shovel which scooped 
up the first symbolic shovelful of earth. (P. 141)
"Unfortunately, at the very same time - fi-om 1954 onward - serious problems 
began cropping up ... bomb tests disclosed somatic, genetic, and environmental dangers 
far worse than anyone had anticipated" (Curtis & Hogan, 1969, p. 25). The potential 
dangers of radiation, still not completely understood, were a troubling contradiction to the 
vision of the peaceful atom. Fallout, a type of radiation known to the public because of 
Hiroshima, became a public-relations problem that the Atomic Energy Commission was 
never able to quiet after a March 1, 1954 nuclear bomb test. The explosion of the 15- 
megaton hydrogen-bomb BRAVO had produced lethal levels of radioactive fallout over a 
7,000-square-mile area of the Pacific, killing a crewman on a Japanese fishing boat and 
heavily contaminating a group of American personnel. (Hilgartner, Bell & O’Connor, 
p.99)
The BRAVO story became a full fledged public-relations problem for the Atomic 
Energy Commission on March 16, 1954, when Japanese newspapers reported that the 
crew of the Japanese fishing boat had arrived in port suffering from radiation sickness 
caused by grey, snow-like particles that fell on the boat after the March 1 test. The 
captain said the boat had been well outside the danger zone established by the United 
States, and that he received no warning before or after the test. And instead of using a
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ordinary word like fallout, the media referred to the phenomenon as "ashes of death," 
which served to heighten the public's growing apprehension of radiation. (Hilgartner, Bell 
& O’Connor, p.99)
The controversy and publicity over the BRAVO test intensified the public's 
anxieties over the potential dangers of radiation and threatened to impede development of 
the fledgling commercial nuclear industry. The vision of a benevolent atom was being 
overshadowed by images of dangerous radioactive fallout, which ultimately resulted in 
concerns about the potentiality of commercial reactor accidents involving large amounts of 
radiation.
A single, 1,000-megawatt reactor could contain fission products equivalent to the 
radiation produced by the radioactive decay of the 4 billion tons of naturally occurring 
uranium contained in all the oceans of the world. (Hilgartner, Bell & O’Connor, p. 101)
The accidental release of even a small portion of the fission products of a single reactor 
would be an unprecedented peacetime (and public relations) disaster for commercial 
power.
The concern over radiation dangers resulted in a sluggish response toward nuclear 
power plant ownership by the power industry in the United States. "The Atomic Energy 
Commission," wrote Hogan, "found itself in the position of a puzzled hostess on the night 
of her party who, hours having passed without a guest showing up, suddenly wonders if 
she put the correct message on the invitations." (p. 26) It was true that planning nuclear 
power projects would be time intensive, especially when most of the nuclear data was 
classified and under the control of the military. Nevertheless, industry seemed to be
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shufiling its feet, waiting to see how the Government's pioneer reactor program with 
Duquesne at Shippingport would do. Not a single application for a construction license 
was received by the Commission.
The Atomic Energy Commission realized there was a need to provide further 
incentives, and accordingly, in January 1955, the Commission armounced a "Power 
Demonstration" program designed to stimulate plant construction." (Curtis & Hogan, p. 
26) Liberal aid was offered to any utility prepared to construct a nuclear plant, in the form 
of research and development assistance and waiver of fuel inventory charges for the first 
five-years of plant operation. And finally, by March of that year, the first application was 
received, followed by two more by the end of the year. In addition, two other projects, 
privately financed rather than pushed by the demonstration program, were also launched.
Despite this seemingly forward motion, the power industry as a whole continued to 
hesitate. It was becoming apparent to the Commission that the reason why many utilities 
had supported the 1954 Act was to ward off a Federal Government threat to go into the 
electricity business if private industry declined to take the nuclear initiative. Author 
James W. Kuhn confirmed the utilities' position;
Under the threat of public power, several utility companies did come forth with plans 
for large-scale nuclear power plants. Officers of the companies expected no profit 
fi"om the plants. The incentive was largely negative - to keep civilian nuclear power 
private. As the president of one of the companies remarked, "We acted because we 
needed to guarantee the position of private industry. The money spent was a gamble 
to preserve the private sector." The president of another of the companies explained
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why his management pushed into nuclear power; "We made a proposal on what 
became Shippingport and we breathed a good deal easier when we didn't get the 
contract. We weren't anxious to get into nuclear power, and I don't think any other 
company in its right mind wanted to get into it either. But you see, we had to bid - we 
had to act - whether we wanted to or not. We had been pushing the private 
development of nuclear power and we couldn't refuse to get into it after pushing so 
hard." (Kuhn, 1966, p. 114)
Industry lobbyists had managed to get a clause written into the 1954 Act 
specifically forbidding the Government to engage in the sale or distribution of electricity 
for commercial use. Now that the threat was averted, private utilities could take more 
time to construct and operate nuclear plants. Or so the utilities thought. That clause had 
a big loophole, however; It permitted the government to sell electricity incident to the 
operation of research and development facilities of the Commission. What was to prevent 
the Government fi-om building numerous research and development facilities and selling 
the incident electricity all over the United States? This was the Atomic Energy 
Commission's major incentive for private utilities to go nuclear.
When the commercial power industry in 1956 continued to stall, taking just 
enough incentive to keep the Government happy, and minimizing risks by forming large 
joint-venture investor groups, the Commission announced the second round of the power 
demonstration program. The second round contained additional subsidies and 
construction of three more reactors began as a result. But still the industry hedged at 
embracing the peaceful atom.
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Then, late in 1956 the Argone National Laboratory's experimental atomic reactor, 
designed specifically for electricity generation, went into operation. The following year 
Duquesne's Shippingport reactor was completed. The entire plant had been proposed, 
designed and constructed in just three years. On December 2, 1957 - fifteen years after 
the first nuclear chain reaction had been achieved at the University of Chicago - the 
Shippingport reactor went critical for the first time, generating 60 megawatts of 
electricity. (Stoler, 1985, p.37)
The power industry nodded appreciatively, but its attention was really fixed on the 
units being erected solely by the private utilities, not those by the Government. The 
former were proving more expensive to build than expected, and it looked as if they might 
prove more expensive to operate as well. Financially, Shippingport's 60 megawatts did 
not come as a bargain to the Government or Duquesne. The cost of producing electricity 
with the plant was many times higher than the prevailing price of electrical power.
Technically, however, the plant proved to be a success. Its completion and 
operation contributed enormously to the prestige of the Atomic Energy Commission's 
Naval Reactors Branch. The plant also served as a feather in the cap of the government's 
“Atoms for Peace” program and helped to establish a reactor design for the nuclear boom 
that would eventually take hold in the early 1960s.
Publicly, however, the completion of the Shippingport plant still had to compete 
with growing anxiety over radiation and the possibility of an accident at a commercial 
reactor. There had been discussion at the 1955 Geneva conferences on atomic energy 
about the probabilities and consequences of a major reactor accident, and a number of
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actual accidents at Government research reactors were beginning to make people question 
nuclear power development.
The issue received widespread public attention with the publication of an Atomic 
Energy Commission report early in 1957, which estimated that as many as 3400 fatalities, 
43,000 injuries, and $7 billion in property damage could result from a commercial reactor 
accident in the United States.
The study was undertaken by more than forty leading experts in the sciences and 
engineering specialties from the Brookhaven National Laboratory. The report, along with 
its estimates of likely death and destruction, also indicated that numerous questions about 
nuclear energy remained unanswered;
The cumulative effects of radiation... is largely unknown. It will be clear that the 
conclusions reached can be little more than educated guesses, since the direct effects 
on humans of exposures of this character are largely unknown. Similarly, setting 
definite limits on acceptable contamination levels for land...is risky... because of the 
incomplete state of present knowledge. Comparatively little is known about the 
problems involved in living in an environment heavily contaminated by radioactive 
material.(Curtis & Hogan, 1969, p.p.58-59)
The Commission's report served to heighten doubts about the necessity of nuclear 
power. Consequently, responding to fears over possible reactor accidents, the World 
Federation for Mental Health commissioned a study of the mental health implications of 
the peaceful use of atomic energy in 1957. The federation said that nuclear power might 
arouse "many irrational fears, or irrational degrees of fear, because of the very special
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types of threats inherent in our popular concepts of atomic energy . "(Hilgartner, Bell & 
O’Connor, 1982, p. 102)
The federation warned that "the techniques of the usual highly skilled public 
relations divisions will not be adequate" to deal with these new problems. What was 
needed were "the technical skills of specially experienced personnel... who are trained in 
the interpretation of deep-seated types of reaction in individuals, groups and populations." 
These people could use their knowledge of personality dynamics" to handle "irrational 
attitudes" and build "positive moral" about nuclear power. (Hilgartner, Bell & O’Connor, 
1982, p. 102)
The World Health Organization responded to the federation's plea in the fall of 
1957, convening the Study Group on Mental Health Aspects of the Peaceful Uses of 
Atomic Energy. In describing its mission, the study group concluded that "the behavioral 
sciences can make a valuable and concrete contribution to the adaptation of mankind to 
the advent of atomic power, making it indeed as painless and as unharmful as possible and 
allowing man to reap a rich harvest from the seed his inventive genius has sown." 
(Hilgartner, Bell & O’Connor, 1982, p. 102) Thus it was no surprise that the group was 
alarmed by the public's "irrational fear" of nuclear power. According to Hilgartner, Bell 
and O’Connor, these irrational fears were not supported by present knowledge:
When the evidence of abnormal emotional response to atomic energy is checked 
against reality it is clear that the response is quite unjustified, in terms both of quantity 
and quality. The balanced conclusion of a review of present knowledge would be that, 
even if all the objective evidence were interpreted in the most pessimistic way possible.
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the weight of evidence would not justify anxiety in the present, and only vaguely and 
remotely in the future. Yet anxiety exists and persists to a quite extraordinary degree. 
This can only be accounted for by looking into the psychological nature of man 
himself, (p. 102)
Even with this public-relations approach in hand, utilities still questioned whether 
the public would generally agree to nuclear power stations in their communities and 
whether the costs of building safe reactors made nuclear power unfeasible. It appeared 
that the cost of insurance alone could price reactors out of the market, and if not, who 
would pay for the claims in the event of a nuclear plant accident?
The insurance industry, on the other hand, was not even certain of how, or even if, 
the emerging nuclear industry should be insured. The beliefs of the insurance industry 
were well expressed in 1956 by Hubert W. Yount, vice-president of Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Company. After considering possible consequences of a major nuclear plant 
accident, Yount was forced to declare to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic 
Energy:
The hazard is new. It differs from anything which our industry has previously been 
called upon to insure. Its potential is still unknown and must therefore be calculated 
currently in terms of a body of knowledge which is expanding from day to day... We 
have heard estimates of catastrophe potential under the worst possible circumstances 
running not merely into millions or tens of millions but into hundreds of millions and 
billions of dollars. It is a reasonable question of public policy as to whether a hazard 
of this magnitude should be permitted, if it actually exists. Obviously there is no
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principle of insurance that can be applied to a single location where the potential loss 
approaches such astronomical proportions. Even i f  insurance could be found, there is 
a serious question whether the amount o f damage to persons and property would be 
worth the possible benefit accruing from atomic fsfeve/ppwew/. [emphasis added]
(Curtis & Hogan, 1969, p. 194)
Thus it appeared that the insurance industry was questioning whether it was 
beneficial to even develop nuclear power at that time. And until questions of safety and 
liability could be answered for utilities, no major investment capital was going to be put 
into nuclear power. "Accordingly," wrote Curtis and Hogan, "our Government held out 
the biggest carrot yet." (p. 28)
In 1957, Congress passed the Price-Anderson amendments to the Atomic Energy 
Act. The amendments were important to nuclear power development. They imposed a 
ceiling on the liability of any nuclear power licensee in the event of an accident at a nuclear 
plant. It was a ceiling that was far lower than the likely costs of such an accident. The 
amendments established a $560 million fund to which the Atomic Energy Commission and 
private insurers were to contribute. It specified that once the $560 million was distributed, 
there was no further liability.(Stoler, p. 37)
Bitterly attacked by critics of the industry, the Price-Anderson amendments 
removed a major obstacle to the private development of nuclear power. With the obstacle 
removed, electric utilities began to apply for licenses to build and operate their own 
reactors. In late 1957 the Atomic Energy Commission issued additional construction 
permits for two commercial nuclear reactors. One went to Commonwealth Edison of
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Illinois to build a 200-megawatt reactor near Morris, Illinois. The other went to New 
York's Consolidated Edison Company so that it could begin construction of a 265- 
megawatt pressurized water reactor at Buchanen, New York.
Although plants were being constructed, development was still not moving at the 
pace the Atomic Energy Commission had envisioned years earlier. The Commission may 
have been demonstrating power, but it was not demonstrating its ability to get American 
utilities to embrace the peaceful atom. A crises began to loom, and after President John 
F. Kennedy took office he requested a thorough assessment of the past, present, and 
future of atomic energy from the Commission.
Curtis and Hogan wrote that the Commission’s response was a 1962 Report to the 
President on Civilian Nuclear Power, which was a major policy statement. Because the 
future of nuclear power was at stake, the report was carefully worded. How, for instance, 
would the commission explain the lackluster response to nuclear energy by the utilities? 
This passage from the report answered that question:
Nuclear electric power has been shown to be technically feasible, indeed, readily 
achieved. Power reactors can be reliably and safely operated. However, contrary to 
earlier optimism, the economic requirements have led to many problems - combining 
low capital cost with long life and assured reliability; lowering costs by improved 
efficiency; developing long-lived and, therefore, economic fuels. Attempts to optimize 
the economics by working on the outer fringes of technical experience, together with 
the difficulties always experienced in a new and rapidly advancing technology, have led 
to many disappointments and frustrations. Experiments have not always worked as
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planned. Many construction projects have experienced delays and financial overruns. 
Such diflSculties led to considerable diminution of the earlier optimism regarding the 
early utilization of nuclear power, which in turn contributed to the withdrawal of some 
equipment and component manufacturers fi-om the field. (Curtis & Hogan, 1969, 
p. 196)
The meaning and implications of the report's findings were clear: the development 
of nuclear reactors at that stage could not be made both technically feasible and 
economical. If the government wanted safe, reliable reactors under present technology, it 
would have to build and operate them at a loss. If the government wanted economically 
competitive reactors, it would have to compromise safeguards.
Such profound revelations, however, carried little weight against an extremely 
determined Atomic Energy Commission and nuclear power development moved forward 
with the construction of additional plants. And soon, utilities were not the only companies 
becoming interested in the possibilities of nuclear power. In July 1959, the first American 
nuclear-powered ship, the Savannah, was launched at Camden, New Jersey. Just over a 
year later, in November 1960, the first U.S.-designed nuclear reactor was started up 
overseas. Built by General Electric, the 16-megawatt reactor at Kahl, West Germany, was 
merely a demonstration project. But it was a successful one, and it helped to sell U.S. 
nuclear technology abroad.
The late 1950s and early 1960s also witnessed the emergence of resistance to 
nuclear power based on potential dangers involved in the disposal of nuclear wastes. Dr. 
Wallace De Laguna of Oak Ridge National Laboratory argued in a 1959 Bulletin of the
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Atomic_Scientists article that when discussing what is safe waste disposal, the nature of 
the hazard must be explained if the public is to appreciate and ensure the enforcement of 
the peculiar precautions required. "But," Laguna worried, "the wastes may then be seen 
as a 'terrifying menace' which may lead us into unwise action."(p. 35)
Most people then involved with nuclear developments had yet to acknowledge that 
any serious problems accompanied the nuclear fuel cycle. Any reference was usually to 
the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation or testing. "Nevertheless," according to 
Falk in Global Fission, "by the end of the 1950s, a few scientists had emerged who were 
sufficiently concerned about the hazards associated with local nuclear activities to begin 
public agitation."(1982, p. 93)
In September of 1959, a letter to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists illustrated 
the start of what would be a successful campaign to stop the Atomic Energy Commission 
from dumping radioactive wastes in the sea off the coast of Massachusetts;
We are members of the Lower Cape Committee on Radioactive Waste Disposal which 
has been protesting proposed atomic waste dumps in Massachusetts waters. With the 
cessation of nuclear weapons tests - a cessation we hope will continue - we believe the 
disposal of radioactive wastes will become the 'number one' radiation problem of the 
nuclear age. Greater attention must be given to its hazards and their proper control.
(p. 123)
The letter referred to twenty-eight dump sites and added that strong opposition is 
expected from the coastal areas of Massachusetts. More significant was the way the 
authors described themselves. "We are," they said, "writing in our capacity as citizens and
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scientists."(p. 123)
The debate remained restricted to the technical community involved in nuclear 
developments until construction on more commercial reactors began and the issue became 
known to others in communities. "Yet it would be necessary for some scientists to both 
draw attention to the technical unknowns and translate their implications into language 
understandable by the public. "(Falk, p. 94)
Many of the first to question nuclear plans as a group were life scientists - 
biologists and ecologists. This was partly because they were much less personally 
involved in the development of nuclear power, but also because they were aware that the 
state of knowledge on the effects of radiation was still rudimentary. They were therefore 
less inclined to the technical optimism of their colleagues in the physical sciences.
A few early actions against nuclear power, in fact, occurred at the beginning of the 
1960s. In 1962 David Pesonen, a forest ecologist, founded a group of citizens to try to 
stop the construction of a 325 megawatt nuclear reactor at Bogeda Head just north of San 
Francisco, California. In the autumn of 1963 the group released 1000 colored balloons at 
the reactor site to show how wind would carry radioactive strontium and iodine.(Falk, p. 
94)
Nonetheless, elsewhere around the United States, nuclear power seemed to be 
catching on quickly. Plants, most of them built by either Westinghouse or General 
Electric, began to sprout up around the country like mushrooms after a rain. By the end 
of 1962, five privately owned reactors were in operation around the United States, 
generating a total of just under 800 megawatts of electricity. The age of full-scale
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commercial nuclear power development was about to begin.
Still, there were those who remained steadfast in their beliefs about the 
development of nuclear power. Representative John P. Saylor of Pennsylvania, speaking 
before Congress in 1963, recalled the deep misgivings he and many other colleagues felt 
about the relative surge forward in commercial nuclear power;
It was not too many years ago, Mr Speaker, that the general public was excited at the 
prospect of the development of an atomic reactor which purportedly would bring vast 
cost savings to consumers of electric power. It is true that a number of Members of 
Congress had serious doubts about the practibility of using millions upon millions of 
dollars of U.S. Treasury funds merely to utilize a new source of energy for power 
generation. I recall that many of us stood on the floor of this House time and again as 
far back as 1956 to question the wisdom of such tremendous expenditures, particularly 
when the U.S. Geological Survey has established without qualification the existence of 
sufficient coal reserves to satisfy the power requirements of the entire nations for at 
least a century to come. Congress also was reminded of warnings by distinguished 
scientists who believed that the safety issues entwined in the fission process should be 
resolved before the wholesale construction of nuclear facilities. (Curtis & Hogan, p. 
24-25)
And in another passage from Saylor's speech;
In other words, Mr. Speaker, although at least 1.3 billion dollars has been poured into 
the civilian reactor program by the Atomic Energy Commission in the past nine years, 
the imbalance of costs between electricity generated by the atom and that generated by
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conventional fuels is still of such magnitude that even the current multi-million-dollar 
bestowals by the Federal Government to the investor-owned utilities may have to be 
increased in order to get the program moving at the rate desired by the Atomic Energy 
Commission. Meanwhile, irrespective of the expensive research carried out since 
1954, the degree of danger hovering over a nuclear power plant remains a mystery. 
(Curtis & Hogan, 1969, p.32)
PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION 
The preceding passages from Congressman Saylor's speech are representative of 
the concerns and resistance to nuclear power development which began to surface during 
the period covering 1953 to 1962. During this period, the government responded to 
President Eisenhower's call to arms under the Atoms for Peace program to find more 
beneficial and benign uses for the atom. Consequently, the government launched a 
determined program to demonstrate the viability of commercial atomic power and provide 
incentives for private utilities to go nuclear.
Rhetoric associated with resistance to the development of nuclear power in the 
first period of this study, 1945 - 1952, was characterized by an interpretative package 
called Pandora's Box. Briefly revisited. Pandora's Box represented early beliefs that 
science had essentially opened Pandora's Box and released its evils upon the world. From 
the viewpoint of those early nuclear power development dissenters, something adverse had 
been released by science onto the world, although the exact nature of that adversity was 
not completely understood at the time.
The nine-years encompassing period two witnessed a steadily improving
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understanding of the potential dangers of radiation. Again, the growing realization of the 
dangers of radiation was due to the close link between the development of nuclear power 
and nuclear weapons. When Japan was bombed, there was little or no understanding of 
what the resulting radiation would do. Radiation sickness was seen for the first time after 
the bombings when the United States established a commission to study the long-term 
efiects of the bombings. Furthermore, testing in the Pacific in 1954 had resulted in large 
amounts of highly publicized radioactive fallout which caused numerous injuries and 
fatalities.
Added to the increasing knowledge of radiation dangers, was a growing awareness 
that nuclear power was not as economically competitive as first contemplated. A joint 
venture between the government and Duquesne Light and Power had resulted in the 
completion of the first commercial reactor in 1957 at Shippingport, Pennsylvania.
However, the cost involved in producing electricity with this plant turned out to be much 
more expensive than burning fossil fuels. In addition, utilities, insurance companies and 
the government struggled with the question of how the commercial nuclear industry could 
be insured and still be economically viable.
The government's response to growing concerns over radiation hazards and the 
economic hurdles of nuclear power was to offer private power utilities vast incentives to 
become nuclear utilities. The most potent of these incentives was the fact that the 
government could sell electricity it produced with "research" reactors, and therefore 
compete against private utilities.
Consequently, efforts and rhetoric opposing nuclear power development during
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this period largely centered on possible radiation hazards, economic difficulties and 
government programs which drove utilities toward commercial atomic power. Thus, 
Pandora's Box, based upon an incomplete understanding of radiation and economic 
hazards, did not remain the dominant interpretive package of opposition rhetoric during 
the second period.
The dominant interpretative package of opposition rhetoric offered during this 
period can best be referred to as Mirage. Consider the following description of nuclear 
power development attitudes and opinions contained within Mirage package:
The splitting of the atom has inspired mankind with a vision of grandeur, a vision of a 
world whose peaceful needs are served by a deadly force rendered tame by men of 
wisdom and good will. Electricity will be too cheap to meter and no material wealth 
will be unattainable. However, it is important for mankind to reflect seriously upon 
the significance of his enterprises, to assess possible ways in which temporary 
advantages are secured only at the intolerable cost of long-range liabilities. Nothing 
better illustrates this truth than the contrast between the potential catastrophic 
consequences of atomic power and its ephemeral, even illusory benefits. One nuclear 
reactor accident alone can create havoc equivalent to innumerable conventional 
disasters, plus the fact that even if no major accident occurs, the cumulative problems 
and financial expenses will burden future generations with a cross of staggering weight 
- these facts point to the conclusion that continued effort to develop a safe atomic 
power program is not worth the risk to humanity.
This package, constructed of vignettes from opposition rhetoric from this period.
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frames nuclear power development as an energy source which was beginning to look a 
little more like fantasy than fact. In a sense, the realities of nuclear power development 
were beginning to separate from the overly optimistic and imaginative predictions about 
nuclear power found at the onset of the atomic age.
In the early years, nuclear power was seen only through the rose-colored glasses of 
technological advancement, material wealth and the antithesis of the destructive atom 
(bomb). But a growing knowledge of radiation dangers combined with immense costs and 
a Governmental program to drive utilities toward the atom, was providing evidence that 
nuclear power was likely more of a bust than technical and economic bounty. As such, the 
dominant interperative package of antinuclear power development rhetoric. Mirage 
reflected that nuclear power was beginning to look more like an illusion
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
CHAPTER 4 
Period Three
By 1967, we had become thoroughly convinced that the entire approach to the handling of 
public health and safety aspects of nuclear energy development was erroneous.
— Gofinan & Tamblin. Population Control 
Through Nuclear Pollution
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
During the nine-years comprising period three, 1963 to 1972, challenges to the 
development of nuclear power continued, fueled by concerns over the economic and 
safety aspects of nuclear power. The public, joined by members of the scientific 
community, began to form into more cohesive groups vocally opposing first nuclear 
weapons testing, and then the development of nuclear power. Concerns about fallout and 
the dangers of radiation continued to grow, fueled primarily by the above-ground testing 
of nuclear weapons.
In August, 1963, President John F. Kennedy joined Great Britain and the Soviet 
Union in signing the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which ended atmospheric testing of 
nuclear weapons. Following the signing of the treaty, the main radiation fallout danger 
would come from French and later Chinese atmospheric testing and from unplanned 
releases of radiation from underground testing.
The signing of the Test Ban Treaty also meant that many groups opposed to 
atmospheric testing had accomplished their goals. "In the early sixties," wrote Harvey 
Wasserman and Norman Solomon, "as the test ban treaty took hold, scientists who had 
devoted long years to fighting for it went back to their laboratories with a sense of
66
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of pollution of the earth." (Wasserman & Solomon, p. 436) In 1969, Gofinan and Tamblin 
urged a tenfold reduction in the Atomic Energy Commission's maximum permissible 
radiation dosed to the general public from nuclear reactors.
The recommendation stunned backers of the peaceful atom. Gofman's and 
Tamblin's findings carried enormous weight; they resulted from six years of work by men 
recognized as experts in their field, conducting a major study initiated by the Atomic 
Energy Commission. Before 1969 only a handful of scientists had considered the issue of 
leaking reactors.
For the most part, the scientific community and the public had been assured that 
reactor leakage would be virtually nonexistent, and at any rate would pose no serious 
health threat. Now Gofinan and Tamblin were saying otherwise. At a major symposium 
in San Francisco in October of 1969, they warned that emissions from commercial power 
plants considered acceptable could in fact harm large numbers of people:
If the average exposure of the U.S. population were to reach the allowable 0.17 rads 
per year average there would in time be an excess of 32,000 cases of fatal cancer plus 
leukemia per year. And deaths will occur year after year. (Wasserman & Norman, p. 
438)
Thus, the growth of nuclear energy opposition during this period was due partly to 
the signing of the Test Ban Treaty, and a shift away from nuclear weapons testing 
opposition. It was also due to the findings of Gofinan and Tamblin and other scientists 
who had, during this period gained a comprehensive understanding of the potential 
dangers of radiation to humans and the environment.
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No matter how compelling the scientific findings, however, scientists like Gofinan 
and Tamblin were practically standing in the path of runaway locomotive during this 
period. The early 1960s marked the beginning of what some historians have called the 
Great Bandwagon Market for nuclear energy. (Kaku & Trainer, 1982, p. 20) Essentially, 
this period was a gold rush to produce nuclear energy electricity.
The construction and operation of the Shippingport reactor in the late 1950s was 
cited as proof that safe, economical nuclear energy was at hand. In 1963, Jersey Central 
Power and Light Company contracted for the purchase of a 515-megawatt reactor to be 
built in Oyster Creek, New Jersey. It would be the first plant to generate electricity 
without benefit of federal subsidy. In addition the contractor. General Electric, had 
offered to build the plant at a fixed cost, which would change only in accordance with 
inflation over the construction period. Accordingly, the utility cited the construction of its 
plant as evidence that the age of commercially competitive nuclear power had dawned.
"The dawn, however, was a false one," wrote Peter Stoler, "and both General 
Electric and Jersey Central Power knew it." (1985, p. 41) The company could claim 
economic viability because it had not borne the full cost of building the Oyster Creek 
plant. The major share of the cost of building the plant had been borne by General 
Electric. The giant manufacturer, which made everything from power plants to toasters, 
had built Oyster Creek for $91 million on a "turnkey contract." (Stoler, p. 41) This was in 
essence a bargain-basement package deal covering equipment and construction, which the 
company made so economically attractive that practically no American utility could turn it 
down.
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The reason for such an approach was simple. The Atomic Energy Commission 
and its contractor companies had made a major investment in developing reactor 
technology. In the five years preceding Oyster Creek's construction, the Commission had 
spent approximately $ 1.2 billion; private companies, including General Electric, had 
invested about half that amount. Now the companies, at least, wanted to get their money 
back. Thirty or so reactor designs had been investigated by the Atomic Energy 
Commission, but only two had been found to be really workable. The Commission had 
endorsed the two designs, and companies wanted to make certain that their products 
became the industry standards.
For both General Electric and competitor Westinghouse, the opportunity to do so 
could not have come at a better time. The early sixties had been a slow period for both 
companies. By 1964, the year that Oyster Creek was actually ordered, sales at 
Westinghouse had remained the same since 1957 and General Electric had barely 
increased its sales during the same period. Morale at both companies was falling lower 
and lower.
For both, moral and sales quickly improved. In 1963 both companies got new 
management. Fred Borch took over as chief executive at General Electric. Donald 
Burnham, a veteran financial executive, took over the helm at Westinghouse. (Stoler, p.
39)
Both men were believers in the vision of the peaceful atom and neither lost any 
time getting his company involved in nuclear power. Borch decided to revitalize General 
Electric by putting the company's substantial resources into a series of high-risk ventures.
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all designed to appeal to the popular imagination - aerospace, computers, and nuclear 
power. Burnham also decided to build Westinghouse's profits by branching out from the 
firm's traditional line of products - including nuclear power. Taking advantage of the leg 
up the company had gained by working with the Navy on the Nautilus submarine and 
Shippingport reactors, Burnham envisioned Westinghouse dominating the reactor market.
The competition between the companies was soon at a fever pitch. General 
Electric Engineers worked at full speed to design plants that were not only economically 
competitive with fbssil-fliel plants, but so much cheaper that no utility could afford to pass 
them up. Westinghouse was just as determined to stay in the race.
Convinced that costs would drop as the experience of building nuclear plants 
accumulated. General Electric decided to win widespread acceptance of its reactor design 
by taking all risks involved in their construction. And this was why the company offered 
to build Oyster Creek at an irresistible price. Westinghouse, not to be outdone, offered 
similar packages and, in an effort to get ahead, accelerated the development of even larger 
reactors.
American utilities, which had initially been slow to adopt the new technology, 
quickly found themselves convinced by the optimistic cost projections put out by 
Westinghouse and General Electric. By mid-1965 "the Great Bandwagon Market for 
nuclear energy was in full swing." (Kaku & Trainer, p. 20) Between 1965 and 1967 
utilities placed orders for fifty nuclear power stations totaling 40,000 megawatts of 
electrical generating capacity.
It was also apparent that by the mid-1960s. General Electric was clearly ahead in
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the race for domination of the nuclear power field. The first company to publish an actual 
price list. General Electric also moved ahead of Westinghouse in increasing the sizes of 
plants. Following a period in which the largest plant built had generated a mere 200 
megawatts. General Electric had forced the pace of the race by building Oyster Creek at 
650 megawatts. A year later, keeping up with the increasing size of coal-fired plants. 
General Electric offered buyers an 800-megawatt model, followed a year later by an even 
larger plant, an 1,100-megawatt plant.
But what really put General Electric ahead in the race was the coup it scored in 
1966 when it sold a reactor to the nation's largest producer of electricity, the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA). Located right in the heart of some of the nation's most 
productive coal country, the publicly owned TVA generated most of its power by either 
burning the locally mined coal or by harnessing the power of major rivers. It had no real 
need to go nuclear, but decided to do so to enhance its image as a progressive, forward- 
looking operation. It did not, however, intend to go nuclear at a premium. Proud of its 
record of providing a great deal of power at low cost, the TVA made it clear that anyone 
who sold it a reactor would have to sell it cheaply.
Both General Electric and Westinghouse were interested in selling reactors to the 
TVA, but General Electric won out over its competitor. General Electric offered the TVA 
a fixed price for two 1,000-megawatt nuclear reactors to be built at Browns Ferry,
Alabama.
The news media hailed the Authority's decision to go nuclear as the start of a new 
era of electric generation in the United States. But the media were not alone in their
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enthusiasm. "Utility companies and their executives," wrote Stoler, "joined in the chorus, 
predicting that costs would actually come down with the building of each successive 
nuclear power plant and forecasting that the price of uranium would also drop as the 
construction of more and more plants created a major market for the nuclear fuel" (p.44).
There seemed at the time to be at least some basis for this prediction. In 1964, 
President Lyndon Johnson signed an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act that provided 
for the eventual private ownership of nuclear fuel. Prior to the passage of the amendment, 
the government had owned all nuclear fuel and leased it to the industry. The amendment 
allowed the utilities to buy and own uranium for their nuclear plants.
But neither the Tennessee Valley Authority contract nor the amendment to the 
Atomic Energy Act, which was actually put into effect in 1969, were enough to convince 
one dissenter. Philip Spom, a former chief of the huge American Electric Power 
Company, had never been convinced by the zealots that nuclear power was economical.
In 1967 he aired his suspicions by producing a detailed analysis of the General Electric bid 
for Oyster Creek. (Price, 1982, p. 9)
His analysis showed convincingly that the claim that cost-competitive nuclear 
power had arrived was premature to say the least. Noting the competition between the 
two reactor building companies, he dismissed the nuclear boom of the mid-sixties as "The 
Great Bandwagon Market," citing the fact that when the Valley Authority sought bids for 
a third plant. General Electric's bargain price was no longer available. "Clearly," said 
Spom, "the General Electric bid on Browns Ferry had been a come-on, and a successful 
one at that" (Stoler, 1985, p.44).
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Spom's study impacted the adolescent nuclear industry. As former chief of the
world's largest privately owned utility with a reputation for running his company
efficiently, Spom would not be suspected of a knee-jerk opposition to nuclear power. Nor
could Spom's three main points be ignored. They were that the utility industry and the
government had become so engrossed in their enthusiasm for the peaceful atom that they
had forgotten that the costs of conventional fuels were decreasing, that the costs of
building nuclear plants were approximately 15 percent higher than those estimated by
utilities, and that the costs of producing electricity with those plants was 20 percent higher 
than originally estimated.
Spom's points were not ignored. But his warning was. He cautioned that the 
electric power industry was going nuclear much too quickly, with construction getting 
ahead of engineering in many areas. And he urged the industry to slow down and allow 
the technology of nuclear generation to develop properly before committing itself to it.
Both the electric companies and the Atomic Energy Commission rejected Spom's
analysis of the situation, indicating that they found the grand old man of electric power
generation too conservative for their tastes. The nuclear power bandwagon was rolling
quickly, and a great many people in the Atomic Energy Commission, the utility industry
and General Electric and Westinghouse had a vested interest in keeping the wagon 
moving.
By then, too. General Electric and Westinghouse were no longer alone in the 
reactor building business. Both Babcock and Wilcox and Combustion Engineering, which 
had been known primarily as boiler makers, had diversified and gotten into the commercial
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reactor business. By the end of the 1960s, operational nuclear plants in the United States 
were generating 4,200-megawatts of electricity. But plants capable of generating a total 
of 72,000-megawatts were either on order or actually under construction.
Once sales began to pick up, all four manufactures switched from the turn-key 
contracts to "cost plus" contracts in which the utilities had to now pay for all cost 
overruns during construction of their plants. Encouraged by a steady national demand for 
electricity that averaged between 7 and 8 percent per year from 1960 through 1972, 
utilities ordered 211 reactors between 1965 and 1974, more than ten times the total 
number of reactors that had been ordered prior to 1965. (Gwin, 1990, p.52)
Overall the Great Bandwagon Market of the 1960s and early 1970s witnessed the 
phenomenal growth and development of the nuclear power industry. But the rapidly 
developing nuclear industry should have listened to Philip Spom's warnings that nuclear 
energy was expanding far too quickly in the United States. The era that witnessed 
accelerated growth for the nuclear industry also witnessed the emergence of two efforts 
which would ultimately move toward convergence and a nationally organized and vocal 
movement against the development of nuclear power.
The first of these efforts was the emergence of unafiBliated groups around the 
United States that united specifically to oppose the construction or proposed construction 
of nuclear plants in their areas. Ever since the proposal and construction of the 
Shippingport plant, a small core of environmentalists, scientists, and informed private 
citizens in the area had been concemed about whether nuclear power plants posed hazards 
to the environment, their immediate neighbors, and the general public.
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Like many within the Atomic Energy Commission, these early adversaries had 
found themselves able to accept the concept of small and mostly isolated nuclear power 
plants. But during the mid-sixties, when the nuclear industry increased orders for reactors 
and began looking at larger and larger plants, people had became more concemed about 
the construction of plants near their communities and about nuclear development in 
general.
Opposition grew because since the completion and operation of the Shippingport 
reactor, scientists and engineers had shown that it was possible to generate electricity 
using the power of the atom. What neither the scientists nor the electric power utilities or 
the Atomic Energy Commission had been able to show was that it was practical.
This became obvious as a plethora of small groups emerged to oppose proposed 
plants in their communities. One such group formed in 1962 when the Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company announced plans to build a nuclear power plant north of San Francisco 
on Bodega Head, the first of five reactors on the 225 acres it had purchased for the 
purpose. A group of citizens banded together to oppose it, at first simply on the grounds 
that land use and conservation would not be well served by destmction of Bodega Head. 
Pacific Gas went ahead with its excavations anyway, in anticipation of the Atomic Energy 
Commission construction license.
Because many conservation groups are simply no financial match for powerful 
utility companies. Pacific Gas didn't anticipate much resistance fi’om the Northem 
California Association to Preserve Bodega Head and Harbor. But the group would not 
quit, appearing at County Commission hearings, before the State Utilities Commission,
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and finally before the State Supreme Court.
"As it progressed, the group attracted some well-informed consultants and 
prominent legal talents, so that by the time Atomic Energy Commission hearings were 
scheduled, a formidable party of two thousand indignant, knowledgeable individuals had 
rolled up its sleeves and dug in for a fight." (Curtis & Hogan, 1969, p. 54) More 
importantly, by that time the original conservation arguments had given way to a far more 
serious allegation; that Bodega Head #1 would be constructed on top of the San Andreas 
Fault.
The San Andreas Fault extends from north of Bodega Bay almost to the Mexican 
border, and is part of a larger system of instabilities. Smaller faults parallel to the San 
Andreas pass through Bodega Head as well. Large earthquakes had occurred in the fault 
area and San Francisco region several times in the past.
The Atomic Energy Commission's reactor Siting Criteria stated explicitly that "No 
facility should be located closer that one-fourth mile from the surface location of a known 
and active earthquake fault." (Curtis & Hogan, 1969, p.56) Yet the reactor was to be 
constructed 1000 feet fi'om the edge of the San Andreas fault, just about 300 feet shy of a 
quarter of a mile.
According to a report by Lindsay Mattisona and Richard Daly in the April 1964 
issue of Nuclear Information, the citizens group called in Dr. Pierre Saint-Armand, a 
professional seismologist from the Naval Ordnance Test Station at China Lake, California. 
After studying the excavation he reported two crucial findings.
First, the reactor site lay in an area where great strain accumulates in the geologic
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formations. He suggested that a great earthquake could be expected within the lifetime of 
the reactor, a view which was ultimately confirmed by a number of authorities. In such an 
event the site would "probably undergo some three or four meters permanent horizontal 
displacement." (Curtis & Hogan, 1969, p.50)
Second, Saint-Armand found that the reactor was being built, in eflfea, on sand. 
After describing the ways in which the foundation material of crushed rock and alluvium 
would shift or transmit shock waves, resulting in serious damage to the reactor, its cooling 
system and supporting structures, Saint-Armand concluded; "A worse foundation situation 
would be difiScult to envision." (Curtis & Hogan, 1969, p.50)
With this information in hand, the group's opposition to the plant turned from 
simply the protection of Bodega Head to fears over the possibility of large scale radiation 
release from an earthquake or other disaster;
The greatest hazard presented lies in the possibility that the tremendous 
accumulation of radioactive fission products imprisoned in the fuel might 
somehow be released into the atmosphere and be distributed by wind, and 
contaminate inhabited areas . These fission products are more toxic per unit 
weight than any other industrial known materials by a factor of a million to a 
billion. (Curtis & Hogan, 1969, p. 11)
Other concerns extended not only to earthquakes, but to potential safety problems 
with the large reactor being considered;
The actual experience with reactors in general is still quite limited and with 
large reactors of the type now being considered, is non-existent. Therefore,
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because there would be a large number of people close by and because of lack 
of experience...it is a matter of judgement and prudence to locate reactors 
where the protection of distance will be present... placing large reactors close 
to population centers will require considerable further improvements in safety, 
and that none of the large power reactors...is considered suitable for location in 
metropolitan areas. (Curtis & Hogan, 1969, p. 103)
In addition, the group opposing the Bodega Head plant found further reason for 
resistance with the information contained in the report. Theoretical Possibilities and 
Consequences of Mqjor Accidents in Large Nuclear Plants. As discussed in the previous 
chapter this report, also referred to as the Brookhaven report, was commissioned and 
released by the Atomic Energy Commission in 1957.
The report found that in the occurrence of a large reactor accident, as many as 
3,400 people might be killed, 43,000 injured, and as much as $7 billion of property 
damage done. People could be killed at distances up to 15 miles and injured as far away 
as 45. Land contamination could extend for greater distances - agricultural restrictions 
might prevail over an area of 150,000 square miles. (“Theoretical Possibilities,” 1957) 
The group opposed to the Bodega Head plant expressed in 1969 the dangers of a 
major plant accident in terms of the Brookhaven report:
The implications of these reckless siting policies are not difficult to imagine. A 
breeze just a few miles per hour higher than average, or an unpredicted shift in 
wind direction, might be all that is necessary to convert a local accident into 
widespread disaster. For example, though Bodega Head, California, is fifty
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
8 0
miles up the coast from San Francisco, some twenty miles farther from a major 
population center than the distance hypothesized in the Brookhaven Report, an 
accident at the proposed Bodega Head power plant might have seriously 
affected San Francisco's population under weather conditions only slightly 
different from those postulated in the Report. The Bodega Head Association 
one day released fifteen hundred balloons from the reactor site, each carrying 
the message: "This balloon could represent a radioactive molecule of strontium 
90 or iodine 131." Some landed in Marin County, Petaluma and Napa and a 
few in Richmond, all in the San Francisco Bay area. (Curtis & Hogan, 1969, p.
102)
Given the seismic discoveries and the efforts of the Bodega Head Association, the 
Atomic Energy Commission had little choice but to act. Giving in to pressure by the 
environmentalists, scientists and citizens, the commissions division of reactor licensing 
canceled the plans for the nuclear reactor. The first cancellation in United States nuclear 
history, the Pacific Gas and Electric debacle might have been expected to produce a pause 
in America's headlong dive into nuclear power. But utilities and nuclear plant builders 
took the cancellation in stride, barely hesitating before pressing on with their plans.
General Electric and Westinghouse engineers and designers dismissed the Bodega 
Head cancellation as an anomaly rather than recognize it as a sign of public discontent 
with the nuclear industry. Both companies were in the business of selling nuclear plants; 
neither was about to be deterred.
As the industry pressed forward, a second effort emerged to hinder or halt the
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developing nuclear industry. Along with centralized citizens groups forming to oppose 
plants in their areas, groups composed of professionals and scientists which already had 
national memberships were beginning to turn a weary eye toward nuclear power. As Jim 
Falk wrote, "Much of the 1960s and early 1970s anti-nuclear activity in the USA came 
from concemed lawyers and scientists who, with the support of local citizens, began to 
oppose nuclear projects at licensing hearings." (Falk, 1982, p. 55)
Intervention in the early 1970s against the licensing of the Calvert Cliffs, Vermont 
Yankee, Indian Point, and Midland reactors, laid the legal groundwork for many similar 
actions in the future. Scientists with a less optimistic view of the peaceful atom came 
together in the Union of Concemed Scientists and offered a pragmatic, but negative view 
of the status of nuclear power:
When one compares the cost and benefits of nuclear energy with the 
altematives, it makes a poor showing. Nuclear power, through nobody's fault 
in particular, has turned out to be a lemon, and it is foolish to keep pouring 
good money after bad by supporting the continued development of nuclear 
energy. (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p.p. 16-17)
Other scientists collaborated with citizen groups or conservation organizations 
such as the Natural Resources Defense Council. One such organization, the Sierra Club, 
split over the nuclear issue in 1969 when its president, David Brower, tried to get them to 
oppose the siting of the Diablo Canyon reactor at Avila beach, Califomia. (Falk, 1982, p. 
55) Brower went on to form the strongly anti-nuclear organization Friends of the Earth.
It set up numerous chapters across the country and offered a more ecological opposition
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to nuclear power:
Split wood, not atoms. Nuclear energy presents us with a fundamental choice 
about what kind of society we wish to be. Do we wish to continue a way of 
life that is wasteful of energy, relies on highly centralized technologies, and is 
insensitive to ecological consequences? Or do we want to become a society 
more in harmony with its natural environment?
Nuclear energy relies on the wrong kind of technology - centralized and 
dangerous in the long run to the earth's ecology. We need to pursue 
alternative, soft paths. We should change our way of life to conserve energy as 
much as possible and to develop sources of energy that are ecologically safe 
and renewable, and that lend themselves to decentralized production - for 
example, sun, wind, and water. Small is beautiful. (Gamson & Modigliani,
1989, p. 16)
Friends of the Earth was not the only coalition to begin spreading an anti-nuclear 
development message. Ralph Nader's citizens organization Critical Mass offered a more 
populist, anti-corporate opposition to the development of nuclear power:
If Exxon owned the sun, would we have solar energy? The root of the 
problem is the organization of nuclear production by profit-making 
corporations, which minimizes accountability and control by the public.
Spokesmen for the nuclear industry are motivated to protect their own 
economic interests, not the public interest. One cannot rely on what they say.
Company officials are frequently dishonest, greedy, and arrogant.
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The nuclear industry has used it political and economic power to 
undermine the serious exploration of energy altematives. Public officials, who 
are supposed to monitor the activities of the industry, they all too often are 
captives of it. They function more to protect the industry than to protect the 
public. (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p. 16)
As the decade of the 1970s began, diverse coalitions were forming across the 
United States to oppose the development of nuclear power. Some centered around 
particular concems: church, conservation, Indian land rights, peace, and pacifism. Others 
brought together people from particular social groupings. Parents, women, technical 
workers, students, and farmers became involved. One important influence on a number of 
the groups was the idea of non-violent action, a strategy pushed forward by the 
Quakers.(Falk, 1982, p.55)
In light of these early anti-nuclear efforts, the 1970s also saw the continued rapid 
expansion of the nuclear industry. In 1972 numerous plants had been constructed across 
the United States and utilities were ordering even more of nuclear. According to Stoler 
nuclear power, in spite of the intervention of different groups was still largely unopposed 
in the United States;
As the decade of the seventies got under way, nuclear power enjoyed almost 
unanimous support in both houses of Congress and strong support among the 
general public, a large segment of which dismissed the anti-nuclear movement 
as a collection of "back-to-nature crazies." (p. 63)
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PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION
No matter how the anti-nuclear movement was initially characterized, the period 
1963 to 1972 witnessed the dramatic growth of both the nuclear power industry and 
opposition to its development. The catalytic event at the opening of this period was the 
signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963 by President John F. Kennedy. 
Interestingly, the Test Ban initially had nothing to do with the development of nuclear 
power - it simply provided guidelines for the continued testing of nuclear weapons.
Prior to the signing to the treaty, those opposed to atmospheric testing did so 
primarily because of the dangers of fallout - basically large amounts of radioactivity. With 
the signing of the treaty, the main radiation danger in the United States would no longer 
come from above-ground testing. The greatest potential for a large radiation release then 
lied in nuclear reactors, most of which held radioactive inventories which might equal the 
detonation of a nuclear weapon. It was only natural that as emphasis shifted from 
weapons to reactors, that the people involved also shifted their opposition.
Consequently, the test ban was partly responsible for the growing body of anti- 
nuclear power development rhetoric during this period. The other cause was the rapid 
development and expansion of the nuclear industry itself. Not only did the numbers and 
different locations of plants increase, but the sheer size of the plants increased as well. In 
terms of development, this period was known as the Great Bandwagon Market for nuclear 
power.
Accordingly, as citizens groups formed and national organizations began to take 
notice and action against the flourishing industry, the accompanying rhetoric reflected
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issues of health, safety, environment and economics. Rhetoric focusing on health, safety 
and environment were motivated by the potential dangers of radiation to humans, animals 
and the environment. Rhetoric directed toward economics resulted from a growing 
awareness that nuclear power would likely never be too cheap to meter.
These issues, radiation and economics, were not significantly different from the 
issues which resulted in opposition rhetoric in the period covering 1953 to 1962. During 
that period, opposition rhetoric was characterized by a growing, but not very complete 
understanding of the potential dangers of radiation had economics involved in operating 
nuclear plants. As such, rhetoric during this period was characterized as a rhetorical 
package named Mirage.
As its name implies. Mirage framed opposition to nuclear power in terms of a 
power source that once appeared to be the panacea to our energy needs. In reality, 
however, this was likely only an illusion because the growing body of evidence about 
radiation and economics would demonstrate that nuclear power was potentially hazardous 
and costly.
As the Mirage package encountered more contemporary opposition rhetoric based 
upon a greater understanding of radiation hazards and economics, it did not undergo a 
significant evolution into a new package. Why did the package not evolve? Simply 
because the issues addressed by opposition rhetoric in the period 1963 to 1972 reflected 
the same overall attitude toward nuclear energy; that it should not be developed because 
its promise of safe, hazard-free and cost effective operations will likely never be realized.
If anything. Mirage is a more "robust" interpretive package during this period.
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Vas Mirage package in the previous period contained rhetoric based upon a growing 
understanding of radiation and economic problems. Vas Mirage package dominant during 
this period is the result of rhetoric based upon a more comprehensive understanding of the 
problems involved in nuclear power. Thus, this package could be referred to as Mirage 2. 
Consider this passage, constructed of opposition discourse from the period, reflecting the 
more mature Mirage package;
It is important for mankind to reflect seriously upon the significance of his enterprises, 
to assess possible ways in which temporary advantages are secured only as the 
intolerable cost of long-range liabilities. Nothing better illustrates this truth than the 
contrast between the potential catastrophic consequences of atomic power and its 
ephemeral, even illusory benefits. A single major mishap in a nuclear reactor will 
cause extreme damage, not because of the explosive force, but because of the 
radioactive contamination...So far we have been extremely lucky...But with the spread 
of industrialization, with the greater number of simians monkeying around with things 
that we cannot completely control, sooner or later a fool will prove greater than the 
proof even in a foolproof system. Human ingenuity has never had at its command a 
wider choice of tools with which to stimulate the economy, provide for the general 
welfare or just make money - all this is being done so rapidly that there is scarcely time 
to look around a assess the safety and economic side-effects of the new technology put 
into action.
Notice that this Mirage package not only reflects the dangers of radiation and a 
rapidly expanding nuclear industry, but begins to predict the potentiality of a disaster from
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a nuclear plant accident. In the previous period(s), speculations about potential accidents 
were based upon an incomplete understanding of the dangers. Forecasts for disaster were 
not only based more on fact than speculation, they also set the stage for the rhetoric which 
would result from a nationally organized and cohesive movement against nuclear power 
development in the 1970s.
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Period Four
There are only seven percent of the people of the world living in the United States, and we 
use thirty percent of all the energy. That isn't bad; that is good. That means we are the 
richest, strongest people in the world, and that we have the highest standard of living in 
the world. That is why we need so much energy, and may it always be that way.
—President Richard M. Nixon
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The period five-year period 1973 to 1978 witnessed probably the greatest amount 
of agitation against the development of nuclear power in the United States. Since 
opposition essentially grew with the development of nuclear power, the anti-nuclear 
movement that has generated publicity since the 1970s can be viewed as a continuation of 
earlier antinuclear power efforts. "Nonetheless," wrote Jerome Price, "it became a large- 
scale social movement with a distinct identity only after the devastating consequences of 
the 1973-1974 energy crises." (p. 9)
Undoubtedly the 1973 Yom Kippur war between Egypt and Israel and the 
resulting embargo of oil to supporters of Israel by the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) was a turning point in nuclear power development. The 
resulting and first "energy crisis" in the United States was actually the result of numerous 
factors, but never before the early 1970s had energy shortages been so directly related to 
world politics and instability.
An awareness of an impending energy crises had, in fact, existed in the government 
with a projection of expansion in nuclear energy as being the eventual cornerstone of
88
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
8 9
energy policy. But the OPEC oil embargo quickly altered priorities and the aim of 
America's energy policy was to make the nation free from dependence upon foreign oil by 
developing energy sources like nuclear power as quickly as possible.
Consequently, for a limited time at the onset of the 1970s, nuclear power 
development continued to enjoy exceptional growth in the United States. Peter Stoler 
framed nuclear power development early in the decade in this way:
"When I was seventeen," begins the ballad popularized by Frank Sinatra, "it was a very 
good year." And not the only such year. The song goes on to describe other good 
years: "When I was twenty-one...when I was thirty-five..." Like the singer, the nuclear 
power industry had its good years, too. In fact, during the late sixties and mid 
seventies, it had several of them, fat years in the biblical sense, years during which it 
seemed that everything was going its way and that the future that nuclear enthusiasts 
had been predicting for years had finally arrived, (p. 78)
There were actually several reasons why the beginning of the 1970s initially looked 
good for nuclear energy and its supporters. One, was the support the industry still 
received from the government, which not only promoted nuclear power but also turned a 
blind eye toward some of its most obvious and pressing problems. The second was the 
growing realization that the age of abundant, inexpensive oil was rapidly drawing to a 
close.
A third reason for the industry's unqualified optimism was the rate at which the 
United States economy - and the demand for electrical energy - was growing. In the ten 
years between the years 1963 and 1973, the demand for electricity grew at an average rate
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of 7.3 percent a year. (Stoler p. 79) American industry was flourishing and using more 
and more electrical power.
Americans, as consumers, owned more electrical appliances and used more 
electricity than anyone else in the world and were, it seemed, the world's most prolific 
users of energy. Americans were using millions of kilowatts of electricity to light their 
homes, to wash their clothes and to run their television sets. There seemed, as far as the 
people in the utility industry could see, no reason why they should not keep doing so 
forever.
Accordingly, the early 1970s found United States reactor manufactures continuing 
to ride the wave of prosperity. Business was still good. Orders for reactors were pouring 
in to both General Electric and Westinghouse in suflBcient numbers to make those firms 
optimistic about the future. Demand for electric power was rising steadily. Utilities were 
not only building nuclear plants; they were also ordering a plethora of fossil fuel-burning 
plants.
But as Murphy's Law states, anything that can go wrong will go wrong. The 
energy bubble burst. In the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur war, members of OPEC raised 
the price of oil fi’om approximately $2.15 to $11 per barrel. The bubble burst when a 
number of OPEC nations imposed an imbargo and actually cut off oil shipments to the 
United States as well as to certain other nations whose policies toward Israel they found 
unacceptable.
The oil embargo quickly and severely impacted the United States. America 
imported less than ten percent of its oil from OPEC. But several other nations received
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almost all their oil from these countries, and the United States had obligated itself to 
assure their supplies, even if it meant selling America's oil to those countries.
The embargo came as a sobering shock to American consumers. It was also a 
warning that the country had become dependent upon outside energy sources and a 
reminder that the fuel American's took for granted could not, even under the best of 
circumstances, be expected to last forever.
The United States, characteristically, sought a quick fix for the problem. President 
Richard Nixon and members of his administration offered one. Nuclear power, in which 
the United States was world leader, was seen as the way of reducing America's need for 
foreign oil and freeing it from the risk of what he termed "energy blackmail." Nixon 
launched "Project Independence," a program which was aimed at having America get half 
of all its electricity from nuclear power by the year 2000. (Stoler, 1985, p. 87)
The President's plan appeared sound at the time. Demand for electricity in the 
United States had been rising steadily for the past decade. But that demand was not about 
to continue. The embargo and resulting "oil shock" stunned Americans and made them 
more consciences of using less energy. For the first time, Americans began efforts to 
conserve fuel and electrical energy. Many confined their efforts to small actions such as 
shutting off unused lights. But others went much further. Realizing than maintaining their 
present level of energy usage was going to prove expensive - assuming that it was even 
possible - large numbers of Americans went on energy savings sprees.
Within a short time, the whole picture of energy economics in the United States 
began to shift radically. By all expectations, atomic energy should have become more
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competitive in this environment. Instead it sent the cost of the reactors soaring, at a rate 
higher than the cost increases in fossil-fliel burning plants. With these costs and the new 
wave of conservation, the demand for nuclear reactors began to decline.
Utility orders for new plants declined drastically, from forty-one in 1973 and 
twenty-six in 1974, to four in 1975, three in 1976, four in 1977, and two in 1978. Plant 
cancellations quickly outnumbered plant orders. In 1978 the number of domestic reactors 
in operation, on order or under construction dropped to 197, the lowest since 1972.
The oil shortages were not the only problem to plague the nuclear power industry 
during the decade of the 1970s. The mid-1970s, and the year 1976 in particular, found the 
antinuclear movement gaining strength and, in some instances, actually taking the 
offensive in the battle over nuclear power development.
The advance of the antinuclear forces had been fueled by the publication of the 
Rasmussen Report, which described the potential disastrous consequences of a nuclear 
accident. The movement further picked up momentum as a series of nuclear plant 
accidents suggested that reactors were not being constructed or run as well as they could 
be. "But what really got the antinuclear forces rolling," wrote Peter Stoler, "were the 
resignations, during 1976, of several long-time nuclear engineers, who not only questioned 
the whole concept of nuclear plant safety, but came over to the opposition and brought 
their expertise with them." (p. 89)
The first of the highly publicized resignations occurred in January of 1976 when a 
electrical engineer with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission announced his conversion to 
nuclear energy adversary. The engineer, who had been one of forty-eight project
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managers at the agency, had been in charge of conducting safety reviews at a number of 
nuclear plants, including several at Indian Point just north of New York City.
He resigned, he said, because of frustration over the Regulatory Commission's lack 
of interest in plant safety, and in doing so, he gave both the agency and the residents of 
New York some cause for thought. In his letter of resignation, which was released to the 
media and widely quoted, he said that after reviewing the design of the Indian Point 
reactors he had come to the conclusion that nothing but "sheer good luck" had prevented 
an accident from occurring at the site. (Pringle and Spigelman, 1981, p.p. 357-358)
The shock waves from that resignation had more or less subsided when, a month 
later, three senior engineers resigned from General Electric's nuclear division in California 
and announced that they were joining the antinuclear cause. One of the engineers fueled 
the antinuclear fires by revealing that he had become increasingly alarmed at the 
technological shallowness of the engineers who conceived current plant designs, and the 
regulators who approved them. He described nuclear power as a technological monster, 
and questioned whether anyone was actually in control of the industry.
By autumn of that year, another Nuclear Regulatory Commission engineer had also 
resigned. Ronald Fluegge charged that the Commission had either "covered up or brushed 
aside nuclear safety problems of far-reaching significance." He also expressed the opinion 
that many plants were being allowed to operate, and in populated areas, despite "known 
safety deficiencies" that could result in serious accidents. (Pringle & Spigelman, 1981, p. 
358)
The impact of these resignations on the nuclear industry was enormous.
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"Throughout the sixties and early seventies, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, and the industry had all been able to dismiss antinuclear groups 
as emotional flower children or as campus upstarts looking for something, anything, 
against which they could protest." (Stoler, 1985, p. 90) Nor had the industry found it any 
more difficult to dismiss or downplay the criticism of biologist who feared the effects of 
radiation or the handful of physicists who opposed nuclear power out of fear of nuclear 
proliferation.
But industry leaders and other nuclear power supporters found it difficult to 
disregard the criticisms of the engineers who had once been the mainstays of the industry - 
engineers who had initially become involved with nuclear power because they believed in 
it and felt that the technology was manageable.
The news media devoted considerable space to the engineer resignations and their 
attacks on the credibility of the nuclear power industry. "But the mass media were not the 
only outlets to seen the significance of this crack in nuclear power's once unbroken facade. 
The industry journal Nucleonics Week carried a story headlined, 'Four Resignations 
Radically Change Complexion of Nuclear Fight.'" (Pringle & Spigelman, 1981, p. 358)
The resignations, and the evidence they provided of dissention within the ranks of 
the nuclear power industry, gave the antinuclear forces the needed ammunition to mount a 
major assault on nuclear power. By the close of 1976 antinuclear critics managed to force 
questions on nuclear power on ballots in six states. It didn't matter that none of the 
referenda passed, or even that the most successful was defeated by a margin of two to 
one. Nuclear advocates cited the defeat of the referenda as a victory over the irrational
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fear of the atom being spread by antinuclear activist.
But supporters were not able to take too much comfort from the votes. For the 
antinuclear forces’ mere success in getting the issue onto the ballots showed their growing 
strength and gave the industry good reason to believe that its popularity was waning and it 
was no longer seen as the source that would provide the solution to America's energy 
problems. The antinuclear movement had evolved from a force that could be easily 
dismissed to one that could no longer be ignored.
The extent of the antinuclear feeling was becoming more visible in the United 
States. Antinuclear action had once been limited to petitioning and occasional picketing. 
By the mid 1970s, it had escalated into attempts to block plant accesses and occasional 
acts of civil disobedience. The movement had grown from local groups opposed to 
specific plants to regional and national coalitions. Bolstered by more and more technical 
converts, the antinuclear forces began to scale up their protests, from demonstrations 
involving hundreds to actions involving thousands.
Naturally, as more organizations formed or joined the movement against nuclear 
power during this period, the quantity of nuclear power opposition rhetoric also increased. 
Groups such as the Sierra Club and the Union of Concerned Scientists joined with newly- 
formed groups in speaking out against nuclear power development in the 1970s. The 
Sierra Club, whom had already begun to speak-out against nuclear power in the late 
1960s, stressed the need for continued intervention:
The safe energy movement has two basic tasks: stopping nuclear power and building 
an energy infrastructure based on the elegant use of renewable sources of energy. We
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need to intervene in the licensing process... We must fight in the political arena against 
the industry lobbyists who effectively control Congress and many state legislatures.
We must non-violently place our bodies in the way of nuclear construction... Day in 
and day out the energy industry's lies and scare campaigns must be countered... In the 
end our task is to convince the American people that we don't have to make a pact 
with the devil to solve the energy crises. (Grossman, 1982, p.262)
Friends of the Earth, another early opponent of the peaceful atom, offered an 
opposition more closely linked to the continued development of nuclear weapons:
The present era of nuclear roulette poses a far greater threat to all living things than 
the Vietnam war did, because proliferation could stumble us into the final war. It is 
not too late to change course, but it will be too late too soon if too few urge the 
change. Exponential growth has led to a destructive race for more and more energy. 
That race led to nuclear power, the once bright hope, which as turned into the greatest 
threat to the future nuclear proliferation, which no one wants. History will admire the 
brilliance that went into trying to get the atom to work peacefully, but will admire 
more the wisdom of choosing not the radioactive path. (Grossman, 1982, p.263) 
Environmental and activist attorney, Irving Like, offered a opposition approach 
based more upon the economical and social impacts of nuclear power development in the 
United States:
The Administration's nuclear power plant program will be abandoned if it becomes 
apparent that it does not command a domestic consensus and its cost is so prohibitive 
as to raise intolerable economic problems... The Vietnam war was terminated by the
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U.S. Government when political and social opposition destroyed any domestic 
consensus for continuing the war. Thus, antinuclear strategy should focus on 
persuading the government and corporate policy makers that the nuclear fission option 
threatens to destroy the political, social, and economic fabric as did Vietnam. 
(Grossman, 1982, p. 263)
The SHAD Alliance, a relative newcomer to the antinuclear movement, also 
stressed the importance of continued activity against nuclear power:
We do not believe that any one type of activity could end nuclear madness by itself. 
However, we are convinced that the collective efforts of citizens joining together on 
all fi'onts will force nukes to be abandoned. Ultimately, the laws which protect nuclear 
studies, power and weapons will be changed. It may take a revolution to stop nuclear 
pollution. (Grossman, 1982, p.264)
The Nuclear Hazards Information Center offered their own perspective on halting 
the development of nuclear power based upon a return to the community centered 
opposition:
Based on limited success citizens have had in halting nuclear power, it appears that the 
most effective method is door-to-door visits to friends and neighbors followed by a 
multi-sponsored town assembly at which prominent speakers present the case against 
nuclear power... For many years nuclear opponents exhausted their resources trying to 
deny licenses by intervening in the regulatory process, which, of course, is rigged. To 
date it has also been unproductive to lobby Congress and put pressure on the 
Executive and federal agencies, but increasingly citizens are getting through to
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township, county and state governing bodies. With the growing strength of the 
movement, a unified drive to change the composition of Congress might for the first 
time be fiiiitfiil... (Grossman, 1982, p.265)
John GoflSnan and the Committee for Nuclear Responsibility presented nuclear 
power opposition based upon the repeal of the Price Anderson Act;
If the President, the Congress, and the nuclear industry believed in the safety of 
nuclear power, they would all immediately demand repeal of the Price-Anderson Act - 
that pernicious law which absolves the utility industry of liability for the causation of 
your death and of your property damage in a nuclear accident. The nuclear menace 
would end in 24 hours after repeal of the Price-Anderson Act, because utilities will 
risk your life but not their dollars. They have no confidence in nuclear safety... Repeal 
of that law would be enough to end the nuclear power problem. (Ibid.)
Connie Hogarth and the Women's International League For Peace and Freedom, 
offered this about ending nuclear power:
We believe very deeply that nuclear power and nuclear weapons will not be stopped 
until the people want them stopped - until people realized that their lives and their very 
future depend on whether we stop this technology. We have been conned by experts 
and expertise bringing us close to any number of disasters: from PCB's to the atom 
bomb to nuclear power plants to plutonium. It is time people realize that they have the 
judgement to determine what's best for them. We think we have to use every non­
violent means at our disposal to make the changes that are to guarantee a future. 
(Grossman, 1982, p.266)
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And finally. Labor Leader William Winpisinger presented opposition based upon 
economics and safety:
Nuclear Energy is Kurt Vonnegut's Ice Nine. It is the Agent Orange of the energy 
industry. It is the most inflationary means of electric power. It is, as Barry Commoner 
has said, a dumb way to boil water. The cost of a nuclear plant is two-and-a-half times 
the cost of coal conversion... There is no such thing as low-level radiation. There is 
only deadly radiation. You can't see, feel, taste, or hear it... But the big energy 
conspiracy tells us that without nuclear power, plants all over won't have enough 
energy. They say, we have to have nuclear power because we need the jobs. More 
energy blackmail. Nuclear blackmail. Job blackmail. (Grossman, 1982, p.266)
These excerpts are but a few examples of representative nuclear power opposition 
rhetoric from this period. Overall, most antinuclear power rhetoric during this period 
embodied the same concerns and issues - usually safety, economics or more 
environmentally "fnendly" sources of energy. Most nuclear opponents were in agreement 
concerning their vocal opposition or direct action against the construction on nuclear 
plants. And few regarded protesting against the proposal or construction of nuclear 
power plants as a lark.
A handfiil of antinuclear activists were probably younger people who simply 
wanted to be against something. Others might have been unable to make the distinction 
between nuclear weapons and nuclear power. But most of those opposed to nuclear 
power acted out of the conviction that the plants were unnecessary and uneconomical.
And almost all acted out of the conviction that nuclear power plants, designed, operated.
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and regulated as they were, were very unsafe.
Opponents protested in the belief that the benefits of nuclear power in no way 
justified the risks that the public was being asked to accept. Their belief was reinforced by 
the message then being preached by engineers then known as the General Electric Three.
Of the defections fi’om the nuclear industry, Stoler wrote that, "The message was 
nothing if not chilling." (p. 94) After resigning, the three had submitted testimony to the 
Atomic Energy Commission that concluded with these words. "The cumulative effect of 
all defects and deficiencies in the design, construction and operation of nuclear power 
plants makes a nuclear power plant accident, in our opinion, a certain event." (Pringle & 
Spigelman, p. 359)
The question, they said, is not whether a nuclear plant accident would occur. The 
question, they declared, is when and where? It was a question that would be answered a 
few years later in 1979.
PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION
With the resignations and growing opposition, the period from 1973 through 1978 
could be viewed as the era in which the scales were tipped in the development of nuclear 
power and nuclear power opposition. Both nuclear power and its opposition were 
developing consistently at the beginning of this period - each could be viewed as generally 
being in an upward growth trend.
Both were also fueled a catalytic event in 1973, the energy embargo and crises 
resulting from the Yom Kippur war between Israel and Egypt. Interestingly enough, this 
catalytic event would not only be responsible for a large body of antinuclear discourse, it
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would be the event that would tip the scales of development in favor of nuclear opposition 
forces.
Prior to the war and the energy crises in the United States, nuclear energy 
development had practically run away. Electric utilities were ordering new and larger 
plants to be built all over the United States. The emerging nuclear power opposition was 
also developing quickly. Groups and coalitions were forming in communities where 
utilities were proposing the construction of plants, and nationally organized environmental 
groups had begun to turn a watchful eye toward the industry.
As the energy crises gripped the United States, nuclear proponents saw it as the 
justification for the rapidly developing industry - and orders for new and even larger 
reactors again increased. Opponents saw, on the other hand, saw the opportunity to 
propose alternate forms of energy as well as energy conservation programs.
In the end, it was the new wave of energy conservationism combined with 
mounting plant construction costs which would cause the electric utilities to stop ordering 
plants and cancel bids for many they had already ordered. Oddly enough, the event which 
should have justified the existence of nuclear power was partly responsible for its sudden 
retarded growth during this period. As a result nuclear power development decelerated, 
while the growth of an organized nuclear power opposition continued.
Consequently, this resulted in not only an upsurge in nuclear power opposition, but 
an upsurge in opposition rhetoric. The issues at the core of this body of rhetoric reflected 
the same basic concerns about the dangers of radiation to humans and the environment as 
well as the inflated costs of constructing and operating plants. The interpretive package
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which framed these same issues in the previous period, 1963 through 1972, was 
characterized by the term M/rage. The Mrage package framed nuclear power 
development in terms of a power source that once appeared to be the panacea to 
America's electrical energy needs. In reality, however, the development of nuclear power 
was more illusion because the growing body of evidence about radiation and economics 
demonstrated that its potential risks outweighed its potential benefits.
During the period 1973 through 1978, \h& Mirage package encountered additional 
rhetoric as citizens and environmental groups and newly-formed coalitions became more 
vocal in their opposition to nuclear power. The additional rhetoric not only contained 
concerns about radiation and cost, but reflected a belief that America was becoming 
committed to atomic energy, but not yet committed beyond the point of ending nuclear 
power generation in favor of alternative forms of energy.
References to this commitment did not occur in earlier rhetorical packages simply 
because the development of nuclear power did not "take-off' until the 1960s. Early 
opponents were resisting the initial development of nuclear power. Opponents during this 
period were resisting any continued development or advancement of nuclear power.
As a whole, the amalgamation of new and old rhetoric resulted in the evolution 
and formation of a new rhetorical package during this period. The new interpretive 
package represented the belief that the United States had partially committed itself to a 
form of energy which was dangerous, economically unwise, and impractical compared to 
alternative forms of energy.
This package, which can be called Devil's Bargain, represented the premise that
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through the commitment to nuclear power, the United States had become somewhat of an 
atomic junkie - addicted to a source of energy both hazardous and becoming more 
expensive to acquire. Like any drug addiction, nuclear power development was framed in 
the package as a Devil's Bargain. America could feel good about its new found energy 
independence, but the price was radioactive dangers and rising costs.
Further, Devil's Bargain implied that America's partial commitment to nuclear 
power, like the drug addiction, would lead to a tragic outcome. Consider the following 
passage, created from opposition discourse from the period, which illustrates the Devil's 
Bargain package.
So nuclear power turns out to be a bargain with the devil. There are clear benefits 
such as inexhaustible electricity and an energy supply that does not depend on the 
whims of OPEC. But sooner or later, there will be a terrible price to pay. We are 
damned if we do and damned if we don't. And the deeper we get in, the harder it is to 
get out.
As with the previous package. Devil's Bargain clearly predicts the potentiality of a 
disaster from a nuclear plant accident. Simply put, if the United States did not curb its 
development of nuclear power, there most certainly would be a disaster. This aspect of 
the Devil's Bargain package was clearly a prophesy for a nuclear reactor related disaster 
and it set the stage for rhetoric which would occur in 1979, the final year in this study.
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Period Five
We screwed up - and I mean by "we" the nuclear community, the vender and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. Davis-Besse was ample warning, and if we had paid ample 
attention to it Three Mile Island could have been prevented. If you want to use the term 
"complacency" to describe our behavior, I won't quibble with you, but the term I'd rather 
use is "mind set," or "attitude." I'd had the attitude that reactors were fairly forgiving, in 
the sense that they could withstand a lot of problems without having those problems turn 
into serious accidents. I don't feel that way anymore.
—Denwood Ross, Deputy Director, Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, 1981
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The final period in this thesis examines only a single year, or to be more precise, 
several months during the year 1979. "On March 28, 1979," wrote Price, "the world was 
abruptly awakened to the perils of nuclear power when a complex series of human and 
mechanical errors resulted in the release of radioactive gases into central Pennsylvania." 
(Price, 1982, p. 19)
"At Three Mile Island, on Wednesday, 28 March, the theoretical possibility of a 
core meltdown disaster became separated from actuality by only a thin tissue of lucky 
circumstance." (Falk, 1982, p. 33) At 4:00 a.m. in the control room of Three Mile Island's 
Unit Two reactor, lights suddenly began to blink on the instrument panel. A siren sounded 
the warning, the first of over 200 alarms that were to sound within the next five minutes. 
(Falk, 1982, p.29) Over the public address system an operator aimounced that a routine 
turbine trip had occurred in the Unit Two reactor.
In the control room, that first alarm sounded to indicate the automatic closure
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of the pump in the secondary cooling system of the Unit Two reactor when the turbine trip 
occurred. This caused little concern. The operators had encountered similar "trips" 
before, and the plant had developed eight such events since the previous October.
Throughout the plant, maintenance crews had worked for weeks to refuel the Unit 
One reactor and bring the Unit Two reactor on-line. Unit Two had been operating for less 
than three months and had been plagued with start-up problems. In January it had been 
shut down for nearly two weeks so that leaky valves could be replaced and in February 
still other valves and pumps had to be repaired.
Instrument panel lights revealed the cause of the turbine trip. Half an hour earlier, 
at 3:30 a.m., workers had begun cleaning a polishing unit that traps minerals in the 
secondary cooling system between the two steam generators and the turbine. During the 
cleaning, the operation of a booster pump in the secondary system had become impaired.
At thirty-seven seconds past 4:00 a m. this caused the associated feed water pumps to trip. 
The result was that the two steam generators were now losing their supply of secondary 
cooling water.
The steam generators were designed to operate like giant tea kettles, powered 
from the core heat transmitted by the primary cooling system. But the accident that had 
closed off the secondary water would leave the steam generators completely dry within 
two minutes and unable to remove heat from the core. As the steam generators began to 
overheat, the temperature and pressure in the primary system also began to rise.
Five seconds later, the steam venting from the core vessel through the emergency 
relief valve had, at last, brought the pressure down to normal. At this point the valve
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should have closed automatically. But this time the valve stuck open. No lights were 
provided to indicate to operators that the relief valve was incorrectly open. As primary 
coolant continued to flow out into a reserve tank, the pressure began to fall and the core 
temperature began to rise.
In the control room the rapidly approaching crises was obscured. For the primary 
cooling system, no light indicated that coolant was flowing out through the stuck relief 
valve. Operators testified later that the relief valve had leaked on so many occasions in the 
past that they paid no attention to gauges showing that the system was overheating. In the 
secondary system the panel lights showed that the auxiliary pumps had commenced 
operation. A tag noting that feed-water isolation valves were on had been attached to the 
panel, but coincidentally obscured a light that would have warned the operators that the 
auxiliary pumps were not working correctly.
This was basically the first eight minutes of the accident. It was only the 
beginning. Over the next few hours the confusion continued. At 4; 10 a m., even as the 
secondary system began to regain pressure, an operator turned off the remaining 
emergency pump, quite possibly leaving the core partially uncovered. After ninety 
seconds he apparently changed his mind and restarted the pumps.
At 5:15 a m. steam in the primary cooling pumps threatened to break them, 
causing the operators to turn them off. At 5:40 a.m., following what they understood to 
be standard procedure in such a situation, they shut down the auxiliary feed water pumps 
for the same reason. Once again the core temperature soared off scale. The Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission estimates that this time it may have reached 1,980 degrees
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Celsius, the temperature region in which theoretical calculations predict a core meltdown 
would start. (Falk, p.p. 36-37) As luck would have it, it did not.
Outside the reactor building the first sign that anything was wrong was the 
sounding of a radiation alarm at 6:50 a m. In the auxiliary building, to which hot 
radioactive water had been pumped, steam relief valves had opened automatically. 
Extractor fans started up, taking the radioactive steam to the atmosphere in a plume which 
drifted towards Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
At 6:50 a m. an on-site emergency was declared and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission and some local officials were notified. At 9:00 a m. the mayor of neighboring 
Middletown was finally informed of the emergency. At 11:00 a.m., seven-hours after the 
first moments of the accident, a general emergency was declared. It was the first ever at a 
commercial nuclear instillation in the history of nuclear power.
Despite the growing problem there was little atmosphere of crises outside the 
plant. When the early morning shift of workers arrived they were turned back by locked 
gates. At they waited they tossed frisbees back and forth. Commented one worker, "It 
was all fun and games at first"(Falk, 1982, p.37). Jack Herbein, vice-president of 
Metropolitan Edison, the company which operates Three Mile Island, told reporters,
"When we say general emergency, it does not mean that an emergency exists. There was 
nothing that was catastrophic or unplanned for." (Falk, 1982, p.37)
Herbein was only partly right. As Stoler wrote about the accident:
The TMI accident killed no one, at least outright. The plant did not blow up, melt 
down, or cause people to glow in the dark, though the accident did generate a certain
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amount of mordant humor, some of which could be seen in some souvenir T-shirts put 
on sale shortly after the accident. The shirts showed a sketch of the island's familiar 
hourglass-shaped cooling towers and bore the legend; 'I survived TMI - I think.' 
(Stoler, 1985, p.96)
In retrospect, the accident was not anywhere near as bad as it could have been.
But it did an enormous amount of damage nonetheless. The accident showed the public, 
government, and power industry that accidents - and potentially disastrous accidents in 
particular - were more than just statistical possibilities.
The accident changed people's perceptions about nuclear risks from the 
commercial nuclear industry. It showed that major accidents, accidents that could 
endanger the lives of hundreds of thousands, that could meet all the conditions of the 
Rasmussen Report's worst-case scenario, could really happen. It showed too, that neither 
utility company executives nor the Nuclear Regulatory Commission really knew how to 
deal with major mishaps at nuclear power plants.
It also showed that the public was not being particularly well protected by the 
agency that licensed and monitored nuclear power plants. One of the things that was 
revealed early in the period following the accident at Three Mile Island was that the 
reactor had been plagued with problems since it first went into operation and that neither 
the utility nor the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had done much to solve them.
The accident at Three Mile Island did not kill or injure anyone immediately, as 
company officials were quick to note. But it did kill public trust, or at least wound, the 
commercial nuclear industry. Americans might have been willing to trust the industry and
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the Nuclear Regulatory Commission before the accident. Now the public was suspicious 
of both. "It's like having your wife catch you in bed with another women," lamented a 
utility company executive. "Even if the marriage stays together, things are never the same 
again. The faith that makes the relationship work is gone." (Stoler, 1985, p. 116)
Not only had the public's trust been severely damaged, but their reactions to the 
accident were immediate and harsh. Price demonstrated in his book The Antinuclear 
Movement:
Shouting, "We all live in Pennsylvania," 35,000 people attended an antinuclear rally in 
Hanover, West Germany, to oppose plans for an underground dump for nuclear 
wastes. In San Francisco, demonstrators played 'dead' outside a utility office, and a 
'die-in' was held outside the office of the Philadelphia Electric Company. Proposed 
bans on new nuclear power plants were introduced into state legislatures, although in 
Austin, Texas, voters approved a bond issue to allow the city to continue participating 
in a nuclear project. The largest antinuclear rally ever took place in Washington D C , 
involving an estimated 65,000 people, following a demonstration o f20,000 people in 
San Francisco, (p. 10)
According to the New York Times the demonstrators in Washington D C , 
included representatives of the Communist party, the Socialist Worker's party, the 
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the Union of Concerned Scientists, 
the Gray Panthers, and the Gay Liberation Movement, among others. (Price, 1982, p.20 ) 
One month later there were more mass demonstrations throughout the United 
States as June 5, 1979 was designated as International Anti-Nuclear Day by movement
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groups. Demonstrators were arrested in Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Massachusetts. Six 
hundred protestors out of an estimated 15,000 were arrested outside of the Shoreham, 
Long Island, nuclear power plant, and in Spain, one demonstrator was killed. (Price, p.
20)
The size of the demonstrations and the number of persons arrested grew larger and 
larger. In October, at Battery Park, New York, over 300,000 people turned out for a 
demonstration in which many of the movement people of the 1960s and early 1970s, such 
as Jane Fonda, reappeared. A few weeks later, 1,045 persons were arrested at the New 
York Stock Exchange in another mass demonstration against nuclear power.
The rhetoric which accompanied this sudden flourish of antinuclear power 
demonstrations reflected previous concerns over radiation hazards and economics as well 
as an element of lessons-leamed. In a sense, the rhetoric reflected that the accident at 
Three Mile Island validated all of the past efforts of nuclear power opposition. In May, 
1979, for instance, the Sierra Club adopted a stronger position on nuclear power based 
upon the events at Three Miles Island:
Events at Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant reaffirm the validity of the Sierra Club 
policy on the lack of safety in nuclear plants and in the nuclear fuel cycle. These 
problems can lead to adverse health and environmental effects. The possibility of 
human failure dooms the nuclear fuel cycle to unacceptable risks. The Sierra Club 
continues to oppose construction of any new commercial nuclear fission power plants. 
Further, the Sierra Club supports the systematic reduction of society's dependence on 
nuclear fission as a source of electric power and recommends a phased closure and
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decommissioning of operating commercial nuclear fission electric power reactors. 
(“Sierra Club Policy,” 1979)
According to McCracken, a book released shortly after the accident by Robert 
Jungk, The New Tyranny: How Nuclear Power Enslaves Us. also provided cause to 
oppose nuclear power in light of accidents like Three Mile Island:
The danger inherent in the use of nuclear energy has been with us now for decades 
and, in spite on many popular efforts to curtail its spread, governments persist in 
expansive programs for its use while telling people that little or no threat exists. The 
radiation leakage at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania is the 
most recent example of the potential for disaster. Even as massive amounts of 
radiation were being released into the surrounding atmosphere, people were told it 
was a 'controlled leak' and that there was little danger. (McCracken, 1982, p. 161)
The National Audubon Society offered the following position on nuclear power 
following the accident:
We now have the chance to halt further construction of the present design and to send 
the nuclear designers back to the drawing boards. If additional nuclear power plants 
are to be built, let them be based on a design in which safety comes first, a system 
which is easy to analyze, a system which is designed specifically to contain 
meltdowns... If our society is to control technology rather than let it control us, we 
must make choices between technologies. We cannot keep giving engineers or 
scientists unlimited chances to run large-scale experiments which put us all at risk...
We should think carefully whether nuclear technology is necessary. When other
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problems with nuclear power are considered, such as the risk of weapons proliferation 
and the risks for nuclear wastes, the case against nuclear power gets stronger and 
stronger. We already depend on one unsatisfactory source of electricity: coal. Do we 
want to lock ourselves into another one? (Kaku & Trainer, 1982, p.p. 106-107)
Even a major study of the Three Mile Island accident sponsored by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission came to a conclusion that was less than favorable about the 
further development of nuclear power:
An attitude of complacency pervaded both the industry and NRG, an attitude that the 
engineered design safeguards built into today's plants were more than adequate, that 
an accident like that at Three Mile Island would not occur - in the peculiar jargon of 
the industry, that such an accident was not a 'credible event." (Hilgartner, Bell & 
O'Connor, 1982, p. 136)
The report also concluded that: 
unless fundamental changes... are made in the way commercial nuclear reactors are 
built, operated, and regulated in this country, similar accidents - perhaps with the 
potentially serious consequences to public health and safety that were only narrowly 
averted at Three Mile Island - are likely to recur... Just as the last major reactor 
accident, the Brown's Ferry fire, slipped beneath the surface of the sea of daily 
concerns 4 years ago, so can Three Mile Island join it in the coming years. It will take 
dogged perseverance in the nuclear industry and in the government to truly learn the 
lessons of TMI. We are not reassured by what we see so far. (Hilgartner, Bell & 
O'Connor, p. 141)
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These passages of opposition rhetoric, although not nearly a complete sample of 
all opposition rhetoric which occurred after the accident, demonstrated that the major 
impact of the accident at Three \ftle Island was psychological. "The accident," wrote 
Stoler, "gave a frightening shot in the arm to the antinuclear forces, which immediately 
launched a drive designed to halt further construction forever." (p. 125)
"This is the beginning of the end," said consumer advocate Ralph Nader as Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission engineers and reporters were speeding toward southern 
Pennsylvania following the announcement of the accident. Others agreed and worked to 
make Nader's prediction a reality. Dr. Helen Caldicott, a long time antinuclear activist, 
and Dr. Ernest Stemglass, a University of Pittsburgh researcher, visited Harrisburg and 
participated in news conferences at which they said that even low-level radiation, like that 
presumably emitted at Three Mile Island, could cause genetic damage, birth defects, and 
cancer. (Stoler, 1985, p. 125)
Some environmentalists and activists demanded the closing of all Babcock and 
Wilcox plants, figuring that what went wrong with the Three Mile Island plant could just 
as easily go wrong at other facilities. Others intensified their assaults - legal and political - 
against plants under construction or awaiting licenses, urging that no more new plants be 
allowed to operate. Still others continued to demonstrate, gathering outside nuclear plants 
fi"om coast to coast and waving their by-now-familiar signs; Hell No, We Won't Glow.
No Nukes Is Good Nukes. Today TMI - Tomorrow...? (Stoler, 1985, p. 125)
"But then," as Price wrote, "a new crises diverted attention away from the nuclear 
issue." (Price, 1982, p.20) The takeover of the American Embassy in Iran and the
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subsequent crisis over the hostage situation pre-empted the antinuclear movement from 
the national media. Demonstrations against nuclear power suddenly declined and 
remained small and sporadic all through the following year. And while nuclear power 
opposition would continue it would never again hit the fever pitch of the periods just prior 
to and after the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979.
PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION 
As the final period of this study, the events beginning in March, 1979 could be 
viewed as the equivalent of the denouement in the progression of antinuclear power 
rhetoric. The catalytic event for this period, the accident at Three Miles Island in 
Pennsylvania, not only created a tremendous amount of antinuclear discourse, but also 
appeared to solidify the antinuclear power movement in the United States. Prior to the 
accident, the antinuclear movement appeared to be steadily converging but had not 
completely coalesced.
For those opposed to nuclear power, the accident was likely a veritable "horn of 
plenty." The accident contained an entire spectrum of potential dangers and problems 
which allowed groups opposing different aspects of nuclear power to come together. As a 
whole, the accident validated the fears of all of the nuclear power opposition that 
potentially disastrous accidents were more than statistical possibilities.
Further, the accident also demonstrated a prophesy-fulfilled for those who had 
railed against and vocally opposed nuclear power for many years. Opposition rhetoric in 
the preceding period 1973 till 1978, was characterized by an interpretive package called 
Devil's Bargain. This package denounced America's commitment to nuclear power as
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more of a bust than boon and prophesied that serious nuclear plant accidents probably 
could and would occur. The accident at Three Miles Island very graphically demonstrated 
the prophecy come true and established the basis for predicting the likelihood of future 
nuclear plant accidents. In essence, if it happened once, it would likely happen again.
The opposition rhetoric which resulted from the accident at Three Mile Island, just 
as with the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, also had the potential to provide fuel to 
evolve Devil's Bargain into a new package which would blend elements of Devil's 
Bargain with rhetoric focusing on the accident. The overall new package that would 
emerge could have conceivably been called Prophesy Fulfilled, and might have reflected 
the dangers of commitment to nuclear energy combined with an example (Three Mile 
Island) of the foreseeable outcome of such a commitment.
As with the example to the Test Ban Treaty, however, rhetoric did not develop 
into a new and distinct package during this period. Rather, the antinuclear rhetoric 
appears to reflect nearly the opposite - to reflect concerns reminiscent of an earlier 
package of antinuclear rhetoric. Three Mile Island provided the impetus for antinuclear 
power groups to combine and escalate their activities. But in terms of the overall 
movement. Three Mile Island was not the end of nuclear power, but a means to the 
possible end of nuclear power.
If Three Mile Island were simply the demise of nuclear power, then certainly the 
antinuclear power rhetoric would have claimed victory, stated, "We told you so," and then 
faded away. This was not the case however. Rhetoric in this period did reflect elements 
of a prophesy fulfilled, but still largely reflected concerns over the safety, cost, and
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radiological hazards of nuclear power. Thus as an interpretive package, rhetoric during 
this period regressed into a package which basically resembled a slightly modified Mirage 
package.
As such, the rhetoric demonstrated the need to continue to warn the American 
public about the potential dangers and economical impacts of nuclear power plants. 
Elements of all the earlier packages were also identifiable in this period, reflecting issues of 
unknown technologies, commitment and future accidents at nuclear power plants.
Consider the following package which demonstrates the modified Mirage rhetorical 
package:
We did not understand what we were getting into with nuclear power. We thought we 
could harness it to maintain our standard of living. Now we are committed to it and 
will sooner or later have to pay a price of unknown dimension. We have unleased it 
but no longer can control it. Nuclear power is a powerful genie that we have 
summoned and are now unable to force back into its bottle; a Frankenstein's monster 
that might turn on its creator. Nuclear power is a time bomb, waiting to explode. 
Nuclear energy is not simply one among several alternative energy sources but 
something more elemental. It defies a cost-benefit analysis. Radiation is invisible and 
one may be exposed without knowing it; its harmful effects may not show up right 
away but may strike suddenly and lethally at some later point. Radiation can create 
grotesque mutants. In a religious version, humans have dared to play God in 
tampering with the fundamental forces of nature and the universe. He who sows the 
wind, reaps the whirlwind.
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DISCUSSION
It’s hard to get a handle on what anti-nuclear activists want - aside from the complete 
shut-down of the nuclear energy industry.
-- Kuglgar EogjsyLlnsigbL96
"The detailing of key value appeals in gay rights rhetoric for a thirteen-year 
period," wrote Darsey, "allows us to make some observations about changes in this 
discourse over more than four decades." (Darsey, 1992, p. 58) Similar observations can 
be made in this thesis, which examined nearly four decades of antinuclear power rhetoric 
from the inception of the nuclear age in 1945 to the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979.
Rhetoric which resulted from an opposition to the development of nuclear power 
appeared at nearly the same instant as the atomic age was bom. Characterized by the 
belief that something inherently dangerous (and not well understood) had been unleashed 
onto the world, the rhetoric was distinguish by an interpretive package called Pandora's 
Box.
This package, the first antinuclear power package, was identified by an opposition 
to the development of atomic power based on a lack of adequate understanding of the 
technology and dangers of radiation. As nuclear weapons and power were developed, 
scientists gained insights into technology and hazards and antinuclear rhetoric evolved into 
a new package that represented the better understanding. This package, called Mmge, 
persisted for nearly two decades and reflected the growing realizations that nuclear power 
was not a particularly safe or cost effective source of electrical energy.
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During the 1970s, often considered the peak of antinuclear activity in the United 
States, antinuclear power rhetoric evolved from the Mirage package to one entitled 
Devil's Bargain. This package, which reflected America's dangerous commitment to 
nuclear power, remained the dominant rhetorical package until the accident at Three Mile 
Island when a modified version of the Mirage package again became the dominant 
package. This progression of antinuclear power packages, examined with the catalytic 
events which preceded the rhetoric, allows several general observations, which are 
examined below, about the rhetoric pervasive to the nuclear power opposition.
Antinuclear Power Rhetoric is Progressive
The rhetorical eras examined by James Darsey (1991) were associated with 
catalytic events and were basically internally homogeneous eras. Examining nuclear 
power development opposition rhetoric as interpretive packages, which are similar to 
Darsey's rhetorical eras, demonstrates that the rhetorical packages are more progressive 
than distinctive.
Each interpretive package represents the dominant "flavor" of antinuclear rhetoric 
for a corresponding historical period, but those packages are not necessarily separate and 
unique within the whole of nuclear power opposition rhetoric. Rather each interpretive 
package, excluding the first, is the result of the package preceding it. The Devil's Bargain 
package would not have become the dominant interpretive package in its historical period 
without the benefit of the knowledge of radiological dangers and costs first dominant in 
the Mirage package.
Viewing antinuclear power rhetoric as a series of progressive interpretive packages
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rather than a series of related but distinct eras, may be an indicator of the overall strengths 
and weaknesses of the rhetoric. Interpretive packages could be viewed as links that form 
a chain that represents on homogeneous antinuclear power rhetoric.
A chain, as the proverb relates, is only as strong as its weakest link. Likewise, a 
serious weakness in an earlier package would directly affect the validity or strength of 
following interpretive packages, as well as the whole of antinuclear power rhetoric. If, for 
instance, the knowledge of radiation or costs which were the basis of the Mirage 
package were found to be false, the Devil’s Bargain package would have been untrue 
since it reflected a belief that America was committing to a dangerous and financially 
unsound form of energy.
Antinuclear Power Rhetoric is Synergistic 
The progressive feature of interpretive packages from historical periods also gave 
antinuclear power rhetoric a synergistic quality. A synergism is the action of two or more 
substances, organs, or organisms to achieve an effect of which each is individually 
incapable. Another more popular explanation of synergism is that the whole is more than 
the sum of the parts.
Each interpretive package of antinuclear rhetoric represents a dominant set of 
beliefs which were built, in part, fi'om the dominant beliefs of earlier packages. As such, 
the most recent package reflected much of the beliefs found in all of the preceding 
packages. The modified Mirage interpretive package contained issues of unknown 
technologies, radiation dangers, financial impacts, and commitment to nuclear power.
These individual issues or beliefs may not have been particularly effective as
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rhetorical opposition to nuclear power. Consistently opposing nuclear power 
development on the basis that it was an unknown technology, for instance, would have 
likely been unsuccessful. Taken all together as a whole, however, the beliefs present a 
sound and valid opposition to nuclear power development that offered a wide spectrum of 
issues that appealed to a larger segment of the American population.
Antinuclear Power Rhetoric Requires Maintenance 
This aspect of antinuclear power rhetoric is similar to the maintenance stage that 
social movements go through during their life cycles. Distinct catalytic events in the 
development of nuclear power provided the opportunity for antinuclear power rhetoric to 
evolve into a new interpretive packages. In two instances the packages did evolve, from 
Pandora's Box to Mirage and from Mirage to Devil's Bargain. In the final period 
examined, however, the rhetoric did not evolve, but regressed to a modified form of an 
earlier package, basically from Devil's Bargain back to Mirage.
This did not appear to represent an inability of the rhetoric to evolve into a new 
interpretive package, but a maintenance stage that is used to reinforce the beliefs put forth 
in earlier dominant packages. Nuclear power and its accompanying issues might have, in 
time, faded from the minds of the public, especially when other events overshadowed 
nuclear power development. A maintenance period, which likely would appear at 
irregular intervals, would function to remind the public and those involved in the 
opposition of the potential dangers and problems of nuclear power.
The final period in this study, the year 1979, and the corresponding interpretive 
package. Mirage, is likely such a maintenance period. While it was a good opportunity
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for rhetoric which validated the efforts of opposition groups, it was also opportunity to 
reinforce why those groups were opposed. This maintenance period was likely both 
necessary and wise in the progression of the antinuclear rhetoric. A specific accident at a 
single reactor like Three Mile Island could eventually fade fi'om the memory over time. 
But, reinforcing issues of safety, environment, cost and commitment served to remind 
Americans of the potential problems inherent in the entire commercial nuclear power 
industry.
Antinuclear Power Rhetoric Relies on the Unknown 
The resulting rhetoric of numerous social movements appears to be based upon an 
identifiable problem with an identifiable solution. Systematic discrimination based on race 
or religion is wrong, and therefore the solution is to seek equal rights and protection under 
the law for all races. Antinuclear rhetoric was the same for the most part, with the 
exception that it always presented what could be called an element of the unknown.
The first interpretive package of rhetoric. Pandora's Box, represented an 
opposition to nuclear power development because it was a little understood, and likely 
uncontrollable technology. Its possible dangers, including those of radiation were 
relatively unknown. When the dangers of radiation and financial impacts came to light in 
following packages, the unknown element was, what would be the result of America’s 
push toward the commitment to nuclear power. When that question was answered in 
1979 at Three Mile Island, the unknown element was, what would the future hold now 
that serious nuclear plant accidents were a reality?
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Antinuclear Rhetoric Exists Beyond the Media 
The popular media in the United States followed the development of nuclear 
power, and more specifically, the development of opposition to nuclear power. However, 
the media did not appear to follow the opposition, and the opposition rhetoric since its 
very beginnings in the United States.
It is important to recognize this since any historian who studied the opposition to 
nuclear power in the media, would likely not find a suflBciently large amount in the early 
years of its development. It appears this is because earlier nuclear power dissenters were 
those likely involved in its development, predominantly the nuclear scientists. Their 
objections, as demonstrated by the first period in this thesis, were largely overshadowed 
by the abundance of pro-atomic rhetoric following the birth of the atomic age.
Later, environmental groups, other coalitions, and then the general public began to 
become involved in the opposition to nuclear power. This was in response to the 
explosive growth in nuclear power during the 1960s and early 1970s. The rise in nuclear 
power opposition during this period coincided with other social movement events 
occurring in the United States to garnish a greater amount of media attention. Finally, the 
Three Mile Island accident, probably resulted in the greatest amount, at least for a short 
time, of media attention to the antinuclear movement.
The historian who studied the movement via the media might be tempted to 
postulate that significant rhetoric began sometime during the later stages of nuclear power 
development, and not at the beginning. Therefore, it is important to recognize that 
significant antinuclear rhetoric exists beyond that reported in the media, in scientific
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journals, speeches, testimony, historical accounts, memos and other documents.
CONCLUSION
Nearly three and one-half million people live in the shadow of the more than one 
hundred commercial reactors that stretch across the country from Maine to Oregon. Like 
most Americans, these nuclear neighbors appear to have settled into an uneasy peace with 
nuclear power. Some are decidedly pro-nuclear, while others have reservations about the 
safety of the plants. Others have gone as far as to organize against nuclear power 
development in their communities while others join national groups opposed nuclear 
power.
The antinuclear movement," wrote Price, "is one of the most significant social 
movements ever to emerge in the United States. Why? The movement has raised issues 
of a scope that encompass the gravest problems yet faced by human societies." (p. 141) 
The rhetoric which has resulted from nuclear power opposition is equally significant for it 
contains the issues, ideologies, ideas, and goals of that movement. The examination of 
this rhetoric is further justified by, "its potential contribution to our understanding of the 
rhetorical behavior of social moments and of rhetoric in general." (Darsey, p. 44)
The general aim of this thesis was to better understand the rhetoric of the 
antinuclear power movement in the United States through a combination of methods 
employed by Darsey and Gamson and Modigliani. An examination of antinuclear rhetoric 
from 1946 through 1979 demonstrated that progressive interpretive rhetorical packages 
could be identified for corresponding historical periods. The historical periods were 
segmented by catalatic events which were events important to the development of nuclear
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power as well as opportunities for antinuclear power rhetoric.
Rhetorical packages for the 34-year period were identified as follows; (1) 
Pandora's Box, (2) Mirage, (3) Devil's Bargain, and (A) Mirage again. The rhetoric of 
nuclear power opposition was also found to be progressive, synergistic, requiring periodic 
maintenance, requiring elements of the unknown, and more expansive than that reported in 
the media.
In general, this method of examining opposition rhetoric in terms of the historical 
events which spawned the rhetoric, is a very interesting and thorough technique that 
allowed the examiner to draw conclusions and gain insight into how rhetoric may evolve 
or regress relatively independently of its attendant social movement.
This method also appears to be a useful tool for future research of rhetoric across 
a given historical period such as the development of nuclear power. For the purposes of 
future research, however, some added types of investigation might be made which could 
provide additional insights into the nature of nuclear power opposition rhetoric.
First and foremost, future investigations should continue to examine instances of 
nuclear power opposition rhetoric which occurred early in the development of nuclear 
power. The late 1960s and 1970s appear to be a convenient entry point into the 
investigation of nuclear power opposition rhetoric because of the sheer quantity of 
rhetoric which occurred. However, to look at only these decades would be to preclude 
what likely could be a large, but not readily apparent, body of nuclear power opposition 
rhetoric.
Secondly, future research into nuclear power opposition rhetoric should also
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investigate the origins of rhetorical artifacts. This study relied on a diversity of rhetorical 
artifacts primarily to demonstrate the origin and progression of nuclear power opposition 
rhetoric. Future research should concentrate on the origin of the rhetorical artifacts in 
order to track rhetorical progression across groups across time. An observation in this 
study was that opposition rhetoric was much like a torch; lit within the scientific 
community, carried by the public, then taken-up again by the scientific community. An 
examination of the origins of this rhetoric might demonstrate not only how rhetoric 
progresses, but how it progress across different groups across a given period of time.
Third, future nuclear power development opposition rhetoric investigations should 
also consider the simultaneous development of nuclear weapons opposition rhetoric. At 
several instances in this study, it was pointed out that the development of nuclear weapons 
was closely linked to nuclear power development, which affected the development of 
opposition rhetoric. Future studies might compare and contrast the development of 
nuclear power and nuclear weapons opposition rhetoric. Such an investigation might 
prove useful in demonstrating similarities, differences, or relationships between the two 
opposition rhetorics.
And finally, future studies should cover a larger historical period. This study 
covered 34-years of nuclear power development. Future studies should address the 
complete development of nuclear power to the present in order to capture the entire 
progression of the attending nuclear power opposition rhetoric. Such an investigation 
would fully capture the origin and development of nuclear power opposition and allow the 
investigator to draw conclusions about the future development of that rhetoric.
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